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Broken bones danced today with the news
Spirits of the disappeared rose up
The hearts of the grieving leapt for once
With a measure of joy.
Oh may the winds scream this news
Into torture chambers in every comer of this world
May blood stained hands of oppressors tremble
May the arms ready to deliver a blow
Freeze
Melt.
We've needed a sign of hope in these times
The people of El Salvador did it again.
Let us dry Neris's tears, kiss Juan's scars, salve Carlos's wounds!
INTRODUCTION
On July 23, 2002, in the courtroom of Judge Daniel T.K. Hurley, a
South Florida jury returned a $54.6 million verdict, encompassing
punitive and compensatory damages, in favor of three Salvadoran
survivors of torture. The case, Romagoza v. Garcia,3 was brought under
Poem by Jean Stokan, Policy Director, SHARE Foundation (www.share-
elsalvador.org).
Robert Collier, Florida Jury Convicts 2 Salvadoran Generals of Atrocities, $54.6 Million
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the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)4 and the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA)5 by three Salvadoran refugees, Dr. Juan Romagoza, Professor
Carlos Mauricio, and Ms. Neris Gonzalez, against two former Ministers
of Defense of El Salvador. One defendant, General Jose Guillermo
Garcia, was Minister of Defense and Public Security of El Salvador from
1979-1983. At that time, the other defendant, General Carlos Eugenio
Vides Casanova, was the Director-General of the National Guard, one of
three internal security forces under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Defense. When General Garcia retired in 1983, General Vides Casanova
was appointed Minister of Defense. With the exception of Dr.
Romagoza, the case was not based on allegations that the generals
personally participated in, or even planned or ordered, the plaintiffs'
6detention or torture. Rather, the case proceeded under the longstanding
doctrine of command responsibility, which provides that military
commanders may be liable for abuses committed by their subordinates
when certain conditions are met.
The Romagoza case followed closely on the heels of Ford v. Garcia,7 a
similar case brought in the same courtroom and against the same two
generals. The plaintiffs in Ford were family members of four United
States churchwomen who were raped and murdered by members of the
Salvadoran National Guard in 1980.8 In November 2000, the Ford jury
rendered a verdict that the generals were not liable for the crimes under
the theory of command responsibility. Apparently the jury was not
satisfied that the two generals had exercised "effective control" over
Awarded To Three Torture Victims, S.F. CHRON., July 24, 2002, at A12. The defendants have
appealed the verdict on the ground that the trial court abused its discretion when it tolled
the ten-year statute of limitations applicable to the Torture Victim Protection Act and the
Alien Tort Claims Act. Romagoza v. Garcia, Brief of Appellants, (Jan. 10, 2003), at 2,
available at http:/ /www.cja.org/cases/RomagozaDocs/RomagozaAppellantsbrief.pdf
(last visited April 29, 2003).
' No. 99-8364 CIV-HURLEY (S.D. Fla. Feb 17,2000).
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2001). The ATCA provides that federal courts may entertain "any
civil suit by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States." Id. To proceed under the ATCA, the plaintiff must be an alien, and
the defendant may be a U.S. or a foreign citizen or a corporation.
Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992), codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (2001). The TVPA allows suits for torture and extrajudicial killing only and
extends jurisdiction to United States citizens.
6 Dr. Romagoza identified General Vides Casanova as being in one of the torture
chambers in which he was interrogated and as being present when he was released from
detention.
' Case No. 99-8359-CV-HURLEY (S.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2000).
' The two cases were filed concurrently in May 1999 and proceeded in parallel until
2000 when the churchwomen's case went to trial.
20031 1215
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their subordinates, which is one of the elements of command
responsibility. 9 Plaintiffs in Ford appealed the jury instructions setting
forth the elements of command responsibility. The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, in an opinion that extensively considered
contemporaneous international precedent emerging from the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("the ICTY"),
found no error in the instructions given by the trial court.'0 The Supreme
Court recently denied certiorari."
Collectively, the Romagoza and Ford cases are significant as the first
modern command responsibility cases in which a defendant testified in
his own defense and was judged by a lay jury, as opposed to by a
professional judge or military officers staffing a military tribunal. These
are also the first cases in which a domestic tribunal closely considered
the modern doctrine of command responsibility as articulated and
clarified by the ICTY. Furthermore, the Romagoza case is the first case in
which civil plaintiffs proved liability under the doctrine of command
responsibility in an adversarial setting under the federal rules of
evidence and procedure. As such, the Romagoza proceedings themselves
deserve close attention for what they can teach about the application of
the doctrine and the strategic and evidentiary challenges it presents.
This Essay will deconstruct the formulation of the doctrine of command
responsibility in the jury instructions employed in the two Salvadoran
cases. It will then discuss the challenges the doctrine poses with
reference to the legal and evidentiary strategies employed by the
Romagoza plaintiffs to prove command responsibility under theS 12
applicable rules of procedure and evidence.
' This supposition is gleaned from questions posed by the jury during deliberations
and subsequent juror interviews by members of the press. See, e.g., Susan Benesch,
Salvadoran Generals on Trial: Command Responsibility in a Florida Courtroom (Aug. 19, 2002),
available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-elsalvador.html (last visited May
14, 2003) (reporting on juror statements); Justice and The Generals (Gail Pellett Productions
Inc.). See generally http://www.pbs.org/wnet/justice/about.html (last visited Mar. 26,
2003) (PBS film about case with juror interviews).
"o See Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2002). The opinion was unique in its
consideration of international legal precedent. See id. at 1290 (noting "[tlhe recently
constituted international tribunals of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have applied the
doctrine of command responsibility since In re Yamashita, and therefore their cases provide
insight into how the doctrine should be applied in TVPA cases."); id. at 1293 (finding
statute of International Criminal Court to be authoritative in ATCA/TVPA context as well).
" Ford v. Garcia, 123 S.Ct. 868 (Mem), 71 U.S.L.W. 3191, 71 U.S.L.W. 3466, 2003 WL
102519 (U.S.).
1 The legal strategies outlined in this Essay were developed collectively by the legal
team in the Romagoza case, which in addition to the author included: Peter Stern (Morrison
& Foerster LLP, Walnut Creek, CA), James K. Green (Law Offices of James K. Green, West
[Vol. 36:12131216
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I. THE LEGAL THEORY: THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
The essence of the doctrine of command responsibility is that a
defendant can be held legally responsible, either criminally or civilly, for
unlawful acts committed by his subordinates. Command responsibility
attaches if the defendant knew, or should have known, that his
subordinates were committing abuses and he did not take necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent these abuses or to punish the
perpetrators.' 3  The command responsibility theory of liability is
premised on the commander's failure to exercise his powers of command
and control over his subordinates in the face of a duty to act. In contrast,
where a defendant has planned, ordered, aided and abetted, conspired
in, or otherwise participated directly in abuses, he is liable under a
theory of direct responsibility. 14 Although originally developed in the
military context, the doctrine of command responsibility applies to both
military and civilian superiors.'5
Palm Beach, FL), Carolyn Patty Blum (U.C. Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall),
International Human Rights Clinic), Joshua Sondheimer (The Center for Justice &
Accountability, San Francisco, CA), in conjunction with plaintiffs' expert witnesses Prof.
Terry Karl (Stanford University) and her research assistant Thad Dunning, Col. Jose Luis
Garcia (Ret.), and Ms. Margaret Popkin (Due Process of Law Foundation, Washington,
DC).
13 Some renditions of the doctrine of command responsibility have existed as long as
there have been military institutions, but the doctrine was employed most prominently
during the many legal proceedings following World War II and concerning high-level Axis
defendants. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Judgment of October 1, 1946,
International Military Tribunal Judgment and Sentence, reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172
(1947); 20 THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE JUDGMENT, SEPARATE OPINIONS,
PROCEEDINGS IN CHAMBERS, APPEALS AND REVIEWS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST (R. John Pritchard & Sonia Magbanua Zaide eds., 1981)
[hereinafter TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL]; "The High Command Case," 10 Trials of
War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No.
10 3 (1951); "The Hostages Case," 11 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg
Military Tribunals Under Control Council No. 10 757 (1950); In re Yamashita, 4 Law
Reports of the Trials of War Criminals 1 (1948).
" See Article 7(1), Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, annexed to Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (1993) ("A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise
aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in... the
present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime."); see also Prosecutor v.
Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement of the Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Tr. Chamber
(Aug. 2, 2001) IT 605, 652 (finding accused directly responsible for abuses and accordingly
disregarding command responsibility counts).
15 In order to sustain a conviction against a civilian superior for command
responsibility, the two ad hoc tribunals have required a showing that the civilian superior
possessed powers of authority analogous to those of a military commander. See, e.g.,
HeinOnline  -- 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1217 2002-2003
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According to most modem formulations, the doctrine comprises three
primary elements:1
6
1. A relationship of subordination - The direct perpetrators of the
unlawful acts were subordinates of the defendant;
2. Mens rea - The defendant knew or should have known that his
subordinates were committing, had committed, or were about to
commit abuses; and
3. Actus reus - The defendant commander failed to take steps to
prevent or punish such abuses.17
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgement of the Int'l Crim. Trib. Rwanda,
Tr. Chamber (Jan. 27, 2000) 9J 880 (finding defendant exercised sufficient de jure and de facto
control over employees of his tea factory to support finding of command responsibility, but
dismissing command responsibility counts involving crimes by non-employees within
general populace); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgement of the Int'l
Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Tr. Chamber (June 25, 1999) 1 75 (noting that doctrine applies to
civilian authorities who are "in a similar position of command and exercise a similar
degree of control with respect to their subordinates."). Because the Ford and Romagoza
cases involved military commanders, military terminology will be employed throughout
this Essay.
6 The doctrine has been codified, albeit with elemental variations, in a number of
multilateral instruments. See, e.g., Article 86(2), Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (Protocol I), reprinted at 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1429
(1977) ("The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a
subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the
case may be if they knew, or had information which would have enabled them to conclude
in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a
breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or
repress the breach."); Article 7(3), Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution
of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, annexed to Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) ("The fact that [the crime] was committed by a subordinate
does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know
that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed
to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the
perpetrators thereof."); Article 6(3), International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens
Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of
Neighbouring States, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/Res/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994); Article 28, Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998).
17 This prong is formulated in the disjunctive, but the prevention and punishment of
abuses are not alternative courses of action available to a commander. Rather, where a
[Vol. 36:12131218
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The finder of fact considers these elements in logical sequence. Thus,
the finder of fact's first step is to determine whether the direct
perpetrators of the acts that underlie the indictment or complaint were
subordinates of the defendant.'8 This prong of the doctrine ensures that
any measures undertaken by the defendant to prevent or punish abuses
would have reached the individuals accused of directly perpetrating the
acts in question. If this prong is satisfied, then it must be determined
whether the defendant was on notice that his subordinates were
committing abuses. It is this knowledge, which may be actual or
constructive, that triggers the defendant's duty to act. 9 Finally, if the
defendant possessed the requisite knowledge, then the finder of fact
must determine whether the defendant fulfilled his duty to act in the
face of this knowledge. In this regard, the finder of fact must determine
whether the defendant did all that was necessary and reasonable under
the circumstances to prevent and punish criminal conduct by his
subordinates. 0  A defendant is legally responsible for the acts
commander fails to prevent known crimes, he cannot absolve his responsibility by
punishing the perpetrators after the fact. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T,
Judgement of the Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Tr. Chamber (Mar. 3, 2000) 336.
"s It is understood that the perpetrators need not be direct or immediate subordinates
of the defendant commander. Rather, they must be within the defendants' chain of
command. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467
(9th Cir. 1994) (finding defendant responsible to plaintiff class for acts perpetrated by
subordinates at all levels within Filipino military); Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330, 335
(S.D.Fla. 1994) (finding defendant responsible for acts of officers and foot soldiers in
Haitian military); Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement of the Int'l Crim.
Trib. Former Yugo., Tr. Chamber (Feb. 26, 2001) 408 (noting that subordination may be
direct or indirect). Likewise, that subordinates may have been under multiple chains of
command or subject to the authority of multiple superiors does not detract from a
superior's own authority and ability to control them. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-
14-T, Judgement of the Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Tr. Chamber (Mar. 3, 2000) It 296,
303; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgement of the Int'l Crim. Trib.
Former Yugo., Tr. Chamber (June 25,1999) 9 106.
" In this regard, the defendant need not have knowledge that the particular victims
themselves would be targeted for abuse. Rather, a defendant is considered to be on notice
when he knows, or should know, that subordinates generally are committing abuses. This
understanding of the operation of prong two finds support in the Marcos class action, in
which the defendant's estate was found liable to a class of almost 10,000 plaintiffs for acts
of torture, disappearance, and summary execution committed by troops under his
command, even though it would have been impossible to show the defendant was aware of
each and every act of violence in the complaint. Hilao v. Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 776 (9th Cir.
1996) (finding Marcos liable if he knew "of such conduct" and failed to use his power to
prevent it).
"Necessary" measures are understood to mean those measures that are required to
discharge the defendant's obligation to prevent and punish criminal behavior under the
prevailing circumstances. "Reasonable" measures are those measures that the defendant
was in a position to take under those circumstances. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-
HeinOnline  -- 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1219 2002-2003
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complained of where there is sufficient evidence that he failed to
implement appropriate preventative and punitive measures in light of
his knowledge that subordinates were committing abuses.
The doctrine of command responsibility does not set forth a strict
liability standard. If the party bearing the burden of proof fails to
establish any of the three elements, a defendant should be exonerated.
This should occur where there is insufficient evidence that the direct
perpetrators were the defendant's subordinates or that the defendant
had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of subordinates' abuses.
Likewise, this should occur where the evidence indicates that. the
defendant undertook sufficient measures to prevent and punish criminal
conduct given the circumstances. In these situations, a defendant should
be exonerated notwithstanding that the victim was injured.
The basic import and function of the three doctrinal elements of
command responsibility have remained stable over time. However, their
precise formulation, and thus evidentiary implications, has evolved
significantly as a result of the ICTY's recent jurisprudence. In
developing this body of law, the ICTY began with the post-WWII
precedent, from which it has significantly developed the law along
several dimensions. In particular, the ICTY jurisprudence has
established more precise legal tests for determining when a direct
perpetrator constitutes the legal subordinate of the defendant, when
knowledge may be imputed to a defendant where evidence of actual
knowledge is either lacking or insufficient, when a defendant has a duty
to investigate the conduct of his subordinates, and what preventative
and punitive measures must be undertaken for a defendant to discharge
his duty under the doctrine.
Because the two Salvadoran cases were slated to be jury trials, the
question of the precise legal standard of the doctrine of command
responsibility arose in the context of drafting the jury instructions.2' In
14-T, Judgement of the Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Tr. Chamber (Mar. 3,2000) 333.
" Prior to the two Salvadoran cases, several other ATCA and TVPA cases had
proceeded according to the doctrine of command responsibility. The majority of these civil
cases resulted in default bench judgments, as the defendant had fled the jurisdiction.
Therefore, the elements of command responsibility did not receive a comprehensive
adversarial treatment and were not codified into jury instructions. As a result, the
language used in these opinions is imprecise and in some instances melds principles of
direct responsibility with those of command responsibility. See, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo,
886 F. Supp. 162, 172-73 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding former Minister of Defense "was aware of
and supported widespread acts of brutality committed by personnel under his command
resulting in thousands of civilian deaths [and] refused to act to prevent such atrocities.");
Paul, 901 F. Supp. at 335 (holding defendant liable for acts committed by his "employees,
representatives, or agents... acting under his instructions, authority, and control and
1220 [Vol. 36:1213
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drafting the jury instructions in both cases, the district court was heavil
influenced by the ICTY's ruling in the case of The Prosecutor v. Delalic,
and in particular by the ICTY's treatment of the subordination prong of
the doctrine. This Essay will discuss the formulation and evidentiary
implications of all three elements of the doctrine of command
responsibility with a particular emphasis on the concept of
subordination, as it proved to be the most significant in the Ford and
Romagoza cases.
A. Prosecutor v. Delalic
Delalic involved the prosecution of four Bosnian Muslim camp guards
and commanders for the mistreatment of Bosnian Serb prisoners of war
in the Celebici prison camp. In setting forth the applicable law, the Trial
Chamber ruled that the required relationship of subordination between
the defendant and the direct perpetrator(s) is established if the defendant
exercised "effective control" over the individual perpetrator(s).23  This
requires showing that the defendant had the "material ability to prevent
24
and punish the commission of the offenses" at issue. Under this
formulation, a showing of de jure command over the direct perpetrators
within a military hierarchy or formal chain of command is a relevant but
not sufficient showing to satisfy the first prong of the doctrine. Thus,
acting within the scope of the authority granted by him"); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.
Supp. 1531, 1537-38 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (finding defendant liable where plaintiffs had alleged
that their torturers were all "agents, employees, or representatives of Defendant acting
pursuant to a 'policy, pattern and practice' of the First Army Corps under defendant's
command"); Doe v. Lumintang, Case No. 00-674 (GK) (AK), Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (Sept. 10, 2001), at 30-33, available at http://www.ca.org/cases
/LumintangDocs/LumintangJudgment.html (finding defendant directly liable for
planning and ordering abuses and indirectly liable under doctrine of command
responsibility). Two cases did require the drafting of jury instructions, but they did not
have the benefit of the ICTY's recent jurisprudence. See Hilao, 103 F.3d at 776-78 (affirming
that Marcos's estate could be found liable if it were determined that Marcos had "directed,
ordered, conspired with, or aided" members of Philippine military or paramilitary forces to
commit acts of torture, summary execution, and disappearance against members of class,
or "knew of such conduct by the military and failed to use his power to prevent it"); Kadic
v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that international law imposes "an
affirmative duty on military commanders to take appropriate measures within their power
to control troops under their command for the prevention of atrocities").
" Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement of the Int'l Crim. Trib. Former
Yugo., Tr. Chamber (Nov. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Delalic Judgement], affd in part and rev'd in
part, Prosecutor v. Delalic, Judgement (Appeals Chamber ICTY, Feb. 20, 2001) [hereinafter
Delalic Appeal].
Delalic Judgement, supra note 22, 91354.
24 Id. 378.
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even where a commander had the legal authority to control the actions of
his subordinates by virtue of his rank or position within a military
hierarchy, a finding of liability under the doctrine of command
responsibility requires proof that the commander could actually exercise
that power as a factual matter. Thus, the Trial Chamber required a
showing of defacto control in addition to de jure command. 2 The theory
behind the adoption of this standard is that the "doctrine of command
responsibility is ultimately predicated upon the power of the superior to
control the acts of his subordinates." 26
The effective control standard for determining subordination was
27
affirmed on appeal. In addition, the Appeals Chamber articulated, in
dicta, the burden of proof for effective control. The Appeals Chamber
stated that a showing of de jure command gives rise to a legal
presumption that the defendant exercised effective control.28  If the
defendant does not come forth with evidence rebutting this
presumption, the existence of effective control can be presumed. The
operation of this presumption has been confirmed in several subsequent
cases in which the ICTY presumed the existence of effective command
on the basis of a defendant's de jure authority because the defendant had
put forth no evidence rebutting the presumption. 29
The ICTY developed the effective control standard in the context of
allegations that the defendants' de jure positions did not accurately reflect
their de facto powers to prevent or punish criminal conduct by
subordinates. For example, in Delalic, the prosecution argued that
defendant Delalic exercised considerable control and authority within
the Celebici camp, even though there was no official instrument or letter
of appointment conferring any formal responsibility over the camp to
him. The Delalic tribunal noted that such situations are often found in
the context of civil wars, in which "previously existing formal structures
have broken down and where, during an interim period, the new,
possibly improvised, control and command structures, may be
' Id. 'U 370 ("The existence of such a position [of command] cannot be determined by
reference to formal status alone. Instead, the factor that determines liability for this type of
criminal responsibility is the actual possession, or non-possession, of powers of control
over the actions of subordinates."); id. T 795.
Id. 1 377.
Delalic Appeal, supra note 22, 11 196-197.
Id. 197.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement of the Int'l Crim. Trib.
Former Yugo., Tr. Chamber (Aug. 2, 2001) T 648; Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-
14/2-T, Judgement of the Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Tr. Chamber (Feb. 26, 2001)1405.
' Delalic Judgement, supra note 22, 91 610.
1222 [Vol. 36:1213
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ambiguous and ill-defined." 31 In subsequent cases, however, the ICTY
has ruled that the effective control standard governs the determination
of the subordination prong in all command responsibility situations,
including those involving de jure commanders whose formal rank or
32position is uncontested.
Although the Delalic tribunal purported to adopt a uniform standard,
the doctrine of effective control requires different inquiries and produces
different legal strategies depending on the particular context of de facto
and de jure command and control. With respect to defacto commanders,
the effective control standard ensures that individuals lacking formal
rank or title, or operating outside of any official or sanctioned chain of
command, can still be held liable for abuses committed by individuals
under their actual command or control. Conversely, with respect to de
jure commanders, the effective control standard ensures that de jure
commanders can be held liable for abuses by individuals not formally
under their command, but who are nonetheless under their control, such
as death squad members or civilians within occupied territory. And, the
effective control standard ensures that commanders possessing formal
command or authority are not held responsible for the criminal conduct
of individuals who may be formal subordinates, but who are not under a
commander's actual control by virtue of the prevailing circumstances.
This argument was precisely the legal defense offered by the defendants
in the Salvadoran cases.
B. Ford v. Garcia Jury Instructions
Based upon the Delalic precedent, the district court issued the
following jury instructions in Ford v. Garcia:
To hold a specific defendant/commander liable under the doctrine
of command responsibility, each plaintiff must prove all of the
following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) That persons under defendant's effective command had
committed, were committing, or were about to commit torture and
31 Id.; see also Delalic Appeal, supra note 22, 91 193 ("In many contemporary conflicts,
there may be only de facto, self-proclaimed governments and therefore de facto armies and
paramilitaries groups subordinate thereto. Command structure, organised hastily, may
well be in disorder and primitive.").
" See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement of the Int'l Crim.
Trib. Former Yugo., Tr. Chamber (Mar. 3, 2000) 91 302; Delalic Appeal, supra note 22, 1 196
("The showing of effective control is required in cases involving both de jure and de facto
superiors.").
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extrajudicial killing;33 and
(2) The defendant knew, or owing to the circumstances at the time,
should have known, that persons under his effective command had
committed, were committing, or were about to commit torture and
extrajudicial killing; and
(3) The defendant failed to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within his power to prevent or repress the commission of
torture and extrajudicial killing or failed to investigate the events in
an effort to punish the perpetrators. 34
The court defined "effective command" to require a showing that "the
commander has the legal authority and the practical ability to exert
control over his troops."35  The instruction also noted that "[a]
commander cannot, however, be excused from his duties where his own
actions cause or significantly contribute to the lack of effective control."6
The court included a separate instruction entitled "Proximate Cause,"
which instructed the jury:
If you find that one or more of the plaintiffs have established all of
the elements of the doctrine of command responsibility, as defined
in these instructions, then you must determine whether the
plaintiffs have also established by a preponderance of the evidence
that the church women's injuries were a direct or a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of one or both defendants' failure to fulfill
The precise formulation of this prong of the doctrine departs from previous
formulations. As has been discussed, see text accompanying note 18 supra, most
formulations of this prong of the doctrine focus on whether the direct perpetrators of the
acts in questions were subordinates of the defendant. Instead, the Ford instructions are
drafted with respect to defendants' subordinates in general. This inquiry is probably better
considered as a corollary to the knowledge prong of the doctrine, which queries whether
the defendant knew, or should have known, that subordinates generally were committing
abuses. This ambiguity in the formulation of the first prong of the doctrine was not the
subject of appeal.
' Ford v. Garcia, Jury Instructions, at 7, available at http://www.lchr.org
/archives/ arcijp /lac/nuns/courtdocs/instructions.pdf [hereinafter Ford Jury
Instructions].
' Id. This definition of effective control departs from the definition employed by the
ICTY. See supra note 23. Significantly, and as noted by Judge Barkett in her concurrence in
Ford, this definition would seem to exclude consideration of defacto commanders who may
lack official "legal authority" to command subordinates but who may nonetheless be found
liable for the actions of subordinates under their actual control. Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d
1283, 1297 (11th Cir. 2002) (Barkett, J., concurring).
Ford, 289 F.3d at 1287 n.3.
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their obligations under the doctrine of command responsibility.
37
37 Id. at 1287 n.4. The Ford plaintiffs' theory of liability was in part premised on the
defendants' failure to adequately punish the individuals accused of murdering the four
churchwomen by improperly delegating the responsibility for investigation to
subordinates and by impeding that and subsequent investigations up the chain of
command. See Ford v. Garcia, Amended Complaint for Extrajudicial Killing, Summary
Execution and Torture (filed February 25, 2000), 1 71-77, available at
http:/ /www.Ichr.org/archives/arc-ijp/lac/nuns/courtdocs/amendedcomplaint22500.pdf
(last visited May 20, 2003). Based on these allegations, the defendants succeeded in
obtaining a delegation instruction, which stated in effect that a defendant could be
absolved from responsibility where he delegated to a subordinate or other authority the
task of investigating or punishing abuses. Specifically, the instruction stated:
A commander may be relieved of the duty to investigate or to punish
wrongdoers if a higher military or civilian authority establishes a mechanism to
identify and punish the wrongdoers. In such a situation, the commander must
do nothing to impede or frustrate the investigation.
A commander may fulfill his duty to investigate and punish wrongdoers if he
delegates this duty to a responsible subordinate. A commander has a right to
assume that assignments entrusted to a responsible subordinate will be properly
executed. On the other hand, the duty to investigate and punish will not be
fulfilled if the commander knows or reasonably should know that that
subordinate will not carry out his assignment in good faith, or if the commander
impedes or frustrates the investigation.
Ford Jury Instructions, supra note 34, at 7. In the Romagoza case, the defendants urged a
similar instruction. In opposition, the plaintiffs argued that a delegation instruction was
inappropriate in light of the facts of their case, which involved no allegations that any legal
process had been initiated with respect to the plaintiffs' cases. The plaintiffs also argued
that the instruction as given in Ford was incorrectly formulated as a matter of law. See
Romagoza v. Garcia, Memorandum of Law in Support of Draft Jury Instructions on
Command Responsibility Submitted in Light of the Eleventh Circuit's Ruling in Ford v.
Garcia (filed May 10,2002), at 15-17, available at http://www.cja.org/cases/Romagoza-
Docs/RomagozaProposedJurylnstructions.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2003). In particular, the
plaintiffs argued that the law of command responsibility constrains the ability of a
commander to delegate responsibility for punishing abuses, because the commander
retains a continuing duty to ensure that any investigation is a credible one that is
undertaken in a manner consistent with an intent to bring the perpetrators to justice. See,
e.g., TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL, supra note 13, at 49,791 (finding that defendant
Hirota "was derelict in his duty" because he was "content to rely on assurances, which he
knew were not being implemented while hundreds of murders, violations of women and
other atrocities were being committed daily. His inaction amounted to criminal
negligence."). No delegation instruction appeared in the Romagoza case. However, the
instructions did indicate that the "failure to punish may be established by proof that the
defendant/military commander failed to investigate reliable allegations of torture and/or
extrajudicial killing by subordinates, or failed to submit these matters to competent
authorities for investigation and prosecution." Romagoza v. Garcia, Jury Instructions,
at 9, available at http://www.cja.org/cases/Romagoza_- Docs/RomagozaJuryInstructions
.pdf (last visited May 14, 2003) [hereinafter Romagoza Jury Instructions].
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After the jury returned a defense verdict, the Ford plaintiffs
unsuccessfully sought a new trial and then appealed to the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals. The plaintiffs argued that the instructions
contained three material errors of law and that the jury's verdict was
against the weight of the evidencei3 First, the plaintiffs argued that the
instructions improperly placed the burden on plaintiffs to prove that the
generals exercised de facto control, in addition to de jure command, over
their subordinates in the National Guard. 39 Rather, they argued, their
burden was to demonstrate the existence of a de jure relationship of
subordination between the defendants and the actual perpetrators. 4°
Once that was established, the burden would then shift to the defendants
to prove as an affirmative defense that they were unable to exercise
41
effective control over their subordinates for some legitimate reason.
Second, the plaintiffs argued that they should not have borne the burden
of proving that the defendants failed to take all reasonable measures to
prevent the murders of the churchwomen or punish the perpetrators.
Rather, they argued, the burden rested with defendants to prove what
their otions were, what they actually did, and why their initiatives
failed. Under this approach, this is properly the defendants' burden
because they were in the best position to produce persuasive evidence in
this regard.44 Third, the plaintiffs appealed the inclusion of the separate
proximate cause instruction on the ground that the doctrine of command
responsibility is a doctrine of imputed liability and thus does not contain
a causation element.
Because the Ford plaintiffs had not objected to the jury instructions at
trial, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the instructions for plain error46 and
upheld the district court's jury instructions.47 With regard to the first
' See Ford v. Garcia, Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of New Trial (filed
Nov. 22, 2000), available at http: / /www.Ichr.org /archives/ arc-jjp / lac /nuns/ courtdocs /
1122memorandumoflawinsupport.pdf (last visited May 20, 2003) [hereinafter New Trial
Memorandum]; Ford v. Garcia, Brief of Appellants (on file with the author) (filed May 30,
2001) [hereinafter Appellate Brief].
3 New Trial Memorandum, supra note 38, at 4; Appellate Brief, supra note 38, at 32.
Appellate Brief, supra note 38, at 32-33.
" Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 34.
4 Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 42.
According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51: "No party may assign as error the
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury
retires to consider its verdict." FED. R. Civ. P. 51.
Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1292-93 (11th Cir. 2002).
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alleged error, the court canvassed the ICTY's command responsibility
jurisprudence and ruled that "a showing of the defendant's actual
authority to control the guilty troops is required as part of the plaintiff's
burden under the superior-subordinate prong of command
responsibility." 48 Although the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the legal
presumption identified by the ICTY, the court opined that the
presumption only shifted the burden of production, not that of
persuasion. 49  The court did not elaborate upon how this legal
presumption should operate within the context of a jury trial, except to
note that instructing the jury as to shifting burdens of production is
disfavored."0 As to the plaintiffs' second alleged error, the court noted
that most modem recitations of the "necessary and reasonable
measures" prong employ the same language that they were
challenging.5s
With respect to the inclusion of the proximate cause instruction, a
majority of the Eleventh Circuit panel ruled that this was unreviewable
"invited error." The court based this ruling on the fact that the plaintiffs
themselves had participated in the drafting of that language and had not
preserved any objection to it.12 Judge Barkett, in concurrence, however,
suggested that the Eleventh Circuit should consider the rule adopted by
the Sixth and Ninth circuits that allows for the reversal of judgments
where invited errors have resulted in "substantial injustice. 5 3 Citing the
Marcos54 and Delalic5 cases, Judge Barkett noted that proximate cause has
never been considered a fourth element of command responsibility.5
6
She stated that the notion of causation is inherent to the doctrine and that
requiring a showing of causation would "practically eviscerate" the
doctrine.57 Based on her review of the Ford trial transcript, Judge Barkett
4 Id. at 1291; see also id. at 1292.
19 Id. at 1291.
o Id. at 1292 (citing Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1321-22 (11th Cir.
1999)).
$' Id. at 1292-93.
52 Id. at 1293-94.
Id. at 1298 (Barkett, J., concurring).
Hilao v. Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 776-79 (9th Cir. 1996).
5 Delalic Judgement, supra note 22, 1 197; Delalic Appeal, supra note 22, 91 398-400;
see also Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement of the Int'l Crim. Trib.
Former Yugo., Tr. Chamber (Feb. 26, 2001) 1 447; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, No. IT-95-14-T,
Judgement of the Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Tr. Chamber (Mar. 3, 2000) 339 ("such a
causal link may be considered inherent in the requirement that the superior failed to
prevent the crimes which were committed by the subordinate").
Ford, 289 F.3d at 1299 (Barkett, J., concurring).
57 Id.
2003] 1227
HeinOnline  -- 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1227 2002-2003
1228 University of California, Davis [Vol. 36:1213
noted that questions from the jury revealed that the proximate cause
language created sinificant confusion among the jury. In her eyes, this
warranted reversal. The Ford plaintiffs' petitions for rehearing en banc9
and certiorariz were denied.
C. Romagoza v. Garcia Jury Instructions
The Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Ford considerably restricted the
formulation of the elements of the command responsibility doctrine in
the Romagoza case. Accordingly, the district court employed the
following jury instructions:
1. The plaintiff was tortured by a member of the military, the
security forces, or by someone acting in concert with the military or
security forces;
2. A superior-subordinate relationship existed between the
defendant/military commander and the person(s) who tortured the
plaintiff;
61
3. The defendant/military commander knew, or should have
known, owing to the circumstances of the time, that his
subordinates had committed, were committing, or were about to
commit torture and/or extrajudicial killing;62 and
4. The defendant/military commander failed to take all necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent torture and/or extrajudicial
killing, or failed to punish subordinates after they had committed
ms Id.
' Ford v. Garcia, Appellants' Petition for Rehearing En Banc (on file with the author).
' Ford v. Garcia, 123 S.Ct. 868 (Mem), 71 U.S.L.W. 3191, 71 U.S.L.W. 3466, 2003 WL
102519 (U.S.). In their certiorari petition, the Ford plaintiffs primarily argued that the
Eleventh Circuit's approach to invited error conflicted with the approach adopted by other
circuits. Ford v. Garcia, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 14 (filed September 2002) (on file
with the author). The Ford plaintiffs argued that the five circuits that have addressed the
issue allow exceptions to the invited error rule where the error resulted in substantial
injustice or affected substantial rights. Id. at 18.
61 In the Romagoza instructions, the court bifurcated the inquiry that is ordinarily
demanded by the first prong of the doctrine. Nonetheless, this Essay will consider these
two inquiries together.
62 The Romagoza court limited the recitation of crimes to torture and extrajudicial
killing because these are the claims for relief allowed by the TVPA, although it could be
argued that knowledge on the part of the defendant that subordinates were committing
other abuses (such as arbitrary detention, deportation, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity) should trigger a defendants duty to act to prevent further abuses.
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torture and/or extrajudicial killing.63
The instructions then explained that to find the element of
subordination, it must be shown that the defendant both held a higher
rank than, or had authority over, the direct perpetrators and had
effective control over them. "Effective control" was defined to mean that
the defendant/military commander had the actual ability to prevent
the torture or to punish the persons accused of committing the
torture. In other words, to establish effective control, a plaintiff
must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
defendant/military commander had the actual ability to control the
person(s) accused of torturing the plaintiff."
The instructions also clarified that it was not necessary to prove that
the defendants knew that the plaintiffs themselves would be targeted for
abuse. The instructions stated that it was sufficient that the defendants
knew that subordinates were committing human rights abuses like those
suffered by the plaintiffs.6 No proximate cause instruction was issued
based upon the reasoning set forth in Judge Barkett's concurrence in the
Ford case.66
While the instructions were being drafted, the plaintiffs argued that
the judge should instruct the jury about the existence and operation of
the legal presumption identified by the Delalic Trial Chamber. They
argued specifically that the jury should have the benefit of considering
the special policies and logical deductions that underlie this
presumption. Further, they argued that the presumption would be
' See Romagoza Jury Instructions, supra note 37, at 7.
Id. Although it was not immediately apparent, this definition of effective control
contains a latent ambiguity when read in conjunction with the rest of the instructions, as
was made clear by a question from one of the jurors during deliberations. Specifically, a
juror passed a note to the court asking, "one juror wants to know, isn't it absolutely
necessary to show the identity of the individuals who tortured the plaintiffs? Or at least
that the individual was a subordinate? It seems something is missing." Romagoza v.
Garcia, Trial Transcript, at 2532, available at http://www.cja.org/cases/Romagoza
Docs/RomagozaTrialTranscripts.shtml [hereinafter Transc.]. This question revealed that
the inclusion of the word "the" before the word "torture" in the definition of "effective
control" suggested that it may be necessary for the plaintiffs to prove that the defendant
knew that the torture of the plaintiffs was occurring and had the actual ability to intervene
at that time. The court gave an additional oral explanation that it was not necessary for the
plaintiffs to prove that defendants knew the precise identity of the individual who tortured
the plaintiffs; rather, plaintiffs must prove only that the direct perpetrators were
subordinates of the defendants within the meaning of that term in the instructions. Id. at
2531.
Romagoza Jury Instructions, supra note 37, at 7.
Transc. at 2373.
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meaningless unless the jury received an instruction on the operation of
the presumption. The court denied this motion, citing language from the
Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Ford counseling against instructing the jury
on shifting burdens.67 Instead of instructing the jury, the Romagoza court
made a legal determination at the close of trial that the defendants had
presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of effective
control.6 s
II. PROVING COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
Given the formulation of the command responsibility doctrine
employed in the Romagoza jury instructions, this Section will discuss the
legal, factual, and evidentiary strategies the Romagoza plaintiffs utilized
to prove the defendants' command responsibility. This Section begins
with a discussion of the defendants' factual defenses as they were
framed within the formulation of the command responsibility doctrine
as employed. It then describes the way in which the plaintiffs sought to
counter these defenses and satisfy their burden of proof by outlining the
plaintiffs' evidentiary strategy and describing their evidence, including
expert and percipient testimony.
A. The Defendants' Case
A number of defensive arguments frequently appear in command
responsibility cases premised on the notion of effective control.' 9 In
addition, the Romagoza plaintiffs were able to anticipate the defendants'
defensive strategy to a certain degree from the latter's testimony during
the Ford trial, their pre-trial depositions, and their documents.
Specifically, the defendants argued broadly that their direct subordinates
were not responsible for the bulk of the violence and that contrary
accusations were the product of an international leftist conspiracy
against the Salvadoran government.70  The defendants at times
categorically denied having had any knowledge that subordinates were
67 Id. at 2527; see Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2002).
Transc. at 2557; see Ford, 289 F.3d at 1292.
" See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement of the Int'l Crim.
Trib. Former Yugo., Tr. Chamber (Mar. 3, 2000) 9 444-49 (summarizing defendant's
arguments regarding disorganization of his troops, his dependence on faulty
communications infrastructure, and factionalization of his military unit).
70 Transc. at 2090 (re-direct examination of Gen. Garcia), 2234 (direct examination of
Gen. Vides Casanova).
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committing torture, arbitrary detention, and other abuses." When
pushed, however, they did admit that they had heard rumors and
allegations of violence being perpetrated by members of the military and
security forces but denied having had any " Froof" that it was their
subordinates who were committing the abuses.
The defendants argued to the jury that the violence in El Salvador
during the period in question came from elsewhere. Their testimony
suggested that the new government, of which they were members, was
trying to "hold the center" in a Cold War maelstrom of violence. The
defendants testified that this violence was attributable to either right-
wing death squads outside of their formal control and sphere of
influence or left-wing insurgents being funded, trained and supported
by Cuba and the Soviet Union.73 By their account, the defendants' efforts
were undermined by antagonistic elements in their midst attempting to
destabilize the government by, among other things, staging multiple
coup attempts. 74 Further, the defendants repeatedly averred that they
were operating within the context of a virulent civil war in which the
very survival of the nation as a bulwark against the spread of
communism in Central America was at stake. In this regard, the
defendants' expert witness, Ambassador Edwin Corr who served in El
Salvador from 1985 to 1988 while General Vides Casanova was Minister
of Defense, expressed on cross-examination some reluctance to condemn
any abuses that may have occurred because he considered it difficult to
judge the situation faced by El Salvador at the time. He later backed off
this position on re-direct examination. 76
"' Id. at 1772 (direct examination of Gen. Garcia), 2161-62 (direct examination of Gen.
Vides Casanova).
n See, e.g., id. at 310-12 (Gen. Garcia deposition designations), 494-95 (Gen. Vides
Casanova deposition designations), 1769-70 (direct examination of Gen. Garcia), 2234
(direct examination of Gen. Vides Casanova). In their case in chief, the plaintiffs played
portions of the defendants' video depositions for the jury.
'3 See, e.g., id. at 282-83 (cross-examination of Amb. White), 1441-42, 1445-59 (cross-
examination of Prof. Karl), 1707 (defendants' opening statement), 1745-46 (direct
examination of Gen. Garcia), 1906-07 (direct examination of Amb. Corr).
I d. at 1713-14 (defendants' opening statement), 1743, 1780-83 (direct examination of
Gen. Garcia), 1902 (direct examination of Amb. Corr), 1970-72, 1992-94, 2002 (cross-
examination of Amb. Corr), 2262 (cross-examination of Gen. Vides Casanova).
I d. at 1904-06 (re-direct examination of Amb. Corr).
76 Id. at 1938-40 (cross-examination of Amb. Corr), 1996 (re-direct examination of Amb.
Corr). Both parties presented testimony from former Ambassadors, who were certified by
the court as expert witnesses pursuant to FRE 702 and as such were granted broad leeway
in offering their expert opinions about relevant aspects of the history of El Salvador
pursuant to FRE 703. The latter Rule allows expert witnesses to give expert testimony
about conversations and documents that might otherwise be inadmissible at trial, so long
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To defend against a finding of "effective control," the defendants tried
to prove that the Salvadoran military's chain of command was
attenuated and decentralized, such that regional commanders retained a
significant degree of autonomy in terms of recruitment, training, and
discipline.7 Further, the defendants tried to establish that the military
itself was factionalized. 78 According to the defendants, any abuses by
members of the military were attributable to a group of rightist hard-
liners being directed, financed, and influenced in part by members of the
oligarchy (the rich landowners) and various Miami exiles. 79  The
defendants also offered testimony that rampant corruption weakened
their command.8° Further, the defendants testified that a system of
military education that created strong loyalties among individuals from
the same graduating class, or tanda, overrode formal command
relationships."' In this regard, the defendants frequently invoked an
incident in which a powerful regional commander had revolted against
812General Garcia's command . Finally, the defendants' expert witness
argued that if the defendants had attempted to investigate or punish
members of the military and security forces for abuses, it would have
further jeopardized the military's unity and cohesiveness.3
The defendants also argued against their exercise of "effective control"
by presenting evidence suggesting that the civil war had created a state
of "chaos" in the country. Therefore, the defendants argued, it was
impossible for them to fully know what their subordinates were doing or
to be able to intervene effectively to prevent or punish criminal conduct,
to the extent there was any.84 In particular, they argued that although the
as such sources are of a kind reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming their opinions or inferences on the subject. See Katt v. City of New York, 151 F.
Supp. 2d 313, 352-54, 356-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (admitting expert testimony regarding
institutional practices and culture, including alleged "code of silence" in police
department).
Transc. at 1892, 1907-08 (direct examination of Amb. Corr).
Id. at 1783-85 (direct examination of Gen. Garcia), 1889-90, 1892, 1906 (direct
examination of Amb. Corr).
' See, e.g., id. at 1048 (cross-examination of M. Popkin), 1887 (direct examination of
Amb. Corr).
o Id. at 1896-97 (direct examination of Amb. Corr).
81 Id. at 1893-94 (direct examination of Amb. Corr).
82 Id. at 1779-80 (direct examination of Gen. Garcia), 1893-96 (direct examination of
Amb. Corr).
Id. at 1940 (cross-examination of Amb. Corr).
' See, e.g., id. at 1456, 1474-77 (cross-examination of Prof. Karl), 1731, 1735, 1746 (direct
examination of Gen. Garcia), 1885-86, 1904-06, 1910, 1916 (direct examination of Amb.
Corr). Allegations of a prevailing climate of "chaos" are a frequent theme in the defense of
actions premised on command responsibility, especially given the effective control
1232 [Vol. 36:1213
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Salvadoran military was formally organized according to a command
structure, the chain of command was not fully functional during the
period in question.8 ' This, according to the defendants, was in part
because the rebel forces had disrupted the country's telecommunications
and transportation infrastructure with acts of sabotage. s6 The defendants
tried to paint a picture of El Salvador as a poor and underdeveloped
nation that did not have the resources or wherewithal to establish an
effective reporting, judicial or disciplinary system within the military.
87
In the face of all this, the defendants portrayed themselves as
"reformers" who had done all that they could to improve El Salvador."
The defendants testified that, despite this chaotic climate and internal
opposition, reforms were implemented, abuses diminished, and
democracy established during their tenures. 9 As proof, the defendants
noted that the United States government had consistently determined
that the human rights situation in El Salvador was improving under
their watch, as demonstrated by the fact that aid, conditioned by
Congress on such improvements, continued to flow during this period.90
The defendants also introduced several Legion of Merit awards and
other diplomatic correspondence that they had received from U.S.
government officials, implying that the United States had seen fit to
commend them on their efforts at reform and nation building.9'
standard. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement of the Int'l
Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Tr. Chamber (May 21, 1999) 491 (noting that Trial Chamber must
view de jure powers of defendant with appreciation for state of chaos in Rwanda and that
"any consideration as to the de jure powers exercised by Kayishema must be subject to an
elucidation of the de facto power, or lack thereof, that he held over the assailants."); id.
218-19, 486-98 (finding that even in chaotic environment, the accused retained his de jure
authority over assailants).
" Transc. at 1712 (defendants' opening statement).
Id. at 294-95 (cross-examination of Amb. White), 1887-88, 1905 (direct examination of
Amb. Corr).
" Id. at 2294 (direct examination of Gen. Garcia).
Id. at 2082-83, 2098, 2135-36 (re-direct examination of Gen. Garcia).
Id. at 1886, 1911-14, 1917-20 (direct examination of Amb. Corr).
o Id. at 1747 (direct examination of Gen. Garcia), 1909-10 (direct examination of Amb,
Corr).
9' Id. at 1786-89 (direct examination of Gen. Garcia), 2242-50 (direct examination Gen.
Vides Casanova). Plaintiffs attempted to exclude these awards on the grounds that they
constituted hearsay, were irrelevant to any issues to be decided, and constituted improper
character evidence within the understanding of FRE 404(a). However, the court ultimately
admitted these exhibits, ruling that the defendants were entitled to present such public
records to the jury because, rather than constituting character evidence, the awards
contained relevant statements by U.S. government officials about the defendants' efforts to
discharge their responsibilities regarding the conduct of the civil war. See id. at 1686-89,
1694-1700, 1849-52. Accordingly, the plaintiffs then attempted to demonstrate, through
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B. The Plaintiffs' Case
1. Establishing Prong #1: Defendants Exercised "Effective Control"
Over Their Subordinates
Given the prior verdict in the Ford case, the plaintiffs were most
concerned about their burden of proof with respect to the first prong of
the doctrine. The evidence was relatively uncontested that the plaintiffs
were detained and tortured by members of the military and security
forces, at least formally under the defendants' command. It remained to
be proven, however, that the National Guardsmen and National Police
members who actually injured the plaintiffs were under the defendants'
"effective control." Further, the plaintiffs anticipated that the defendants
would suggest that death squads who were outside the formal military
hierarchy and the defendants' chain of command were primarily
responsible both for the violence in El Salvador and for the harm that the
plaintiffs' suffered.
The doctrine of command responsibility is premised upon a
defendant's omissions of command. Therefore, the effective control
standard requires the party with the burden of proof to demonstrate that
the defendant possessed powers he did not properly use. Thus, the
Romagoza plaintiffs had to demonstrate that the defendants could
exercise their command when they wanted to and thus could have
prevented or punished criminal conduct by their subordinates.
Accordingly, as a threshold matter, the plaintiffs attempted to prove the
extent of the defendants' de jure command and authority. They also
attempted to prove that there were no impediments, logistical, legal, or
situational, to the defendants exercising the full scope of their de jure
command. In this regard, the plaintiffs presented evidence of the
defendants' de facto command, showing that the defendants had, on
specific occasions, effectively exercised their command. Indeed, the
plaintiffs presented evidence that suggested that the defendants' de facto
authority actually exceeded their de jure authority.92 Thus, the plaintiffs'
expert testimony, that such awards were mere diplomatic pageantry and that other
individuals subsequently implicated in human rights abuses had received them in the past,
but this line of testimony was limited because the plaintiffs could not establish that their
expert witness had expertise in this area. Id. at 2300-03 (rebuttal examination of Col.
Garcia).
" Thus, the effective control standard suggests a mechanism for holding defendants
liable for actions that would be beyond their actual authority in a formal or technical sense.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement of the Int'l Crim. Trib.
Former Yugo., Tr. Chamber (Feb. 26, 2001) 1 422 (noting that in civil war situations, civilian
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evidence lead to the conclusion that had the defendants properly
exercised their command over their troops, any training, reporting, or
disciplinary measures implemented would have reached the direct
perpetrators of the acts in question.
a. Proof that Members of the Military or Security Forces Abducted
and Tortured the Plaintiffs
All three plaintiffs testified that they were detained and/or tortured
by members of the Salvadoran military or security forces, and the
defendants offered little contrary evidence. Specifically, Professor
Mauricio was detained and tortured for approximately one and a half
weeks in the National Police headquarters in San Salvador; Dr.
Romagoza was detained during a joint operation of Salvadoran
infantrymen and National Guardsmen, taken to a National Guard post,
and then transferred to the National Guard headquarters in San Salvador
where he was detained and tortured for approximately three weeks; and
Ms. Gonzales was detained and tortured in the National Guard post in
San Vicente for approximately two weeks.93  Because they were
blindfolded much of the time, the plaintiffs could not identify by name
or rank all of the individuals who detained and tortured them.
However, they were able to give some testimony about the uniforms and
boots worn, the type of vehicles and arms employed, the way in which
orders were given and received by individuals at various levels of an
apparent hierarchy within the detention centers, and the formalized way
in which detainees were processed and interrogated within these
detention centers. For example, at one point, Professor Mauricio was
photographed without his blindfold, so he was able to see his captors
briefly.94 In addition, all of the plaintiffs saw their captors upon their
capture and release from detention.95
leaders may assume powers more important and potent than those with which they are
officially vested); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement of the Int'l
Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Tr. Chamber (May 21, 1999) 219 (noting that consideration of
defendant's de jure authority alone would overlook prosecution's allegations that accused
exercised effective control over members of interahamwe, who were not within his formal
chain of command).
" See Romagoza v. Garcia, Case No. 99-8364 CIV-HURLEY, Second Amended
Complaint For Torture; Crimes Against Humanity; Cruel, Inhuman Or Degrading
Treatment Or Punishment; And Arbitrary Detention (filed Feb. 17, 2000), available at
http://www.cja.org/cases/Romagoza-Docs/RomagozaComplaint.htm (last visited Jan.
15,2003).
Transc. at 592-93 (direct examination of Prof. Mauricio).
Id. at 99-104, 132 (direct examination of Dr. Romagoza), 579-91, 619 (direct
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Professor Mauricio amassed a surprising amount of evidence
documenting his abduction and detention by the National Police. For
example, he introduced into evidence a letter from the Defense Ministry
that had been received by a colleague who had initiated a campaign for
his release and that confirmed that Professor Mauricio had been detained
and was being "investigated" by the National Police.96 Similarly, he had
obtained a certificate from the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) indicating that an ICRC representative had visited him in the
National Police headquarters prior to his release.97
Although the Romagoza case did not involve allegations of the
involvement of death squads in their detention or abuse, there was a
concern that the jury would find credible the defendants' assertions that
death squads, rather than members of the "regular" military and security
forces, were responsible for the plaintiffs' injuries. To counter this, the
plaintiffs presented testimony that the death squads did not act outside
the formal military system. Rather, the plaintiffs presented testimony
that the death squads actually operated out of the regular military and
security headquarters and posts and were composed in large measure of
off duty or retired military and security force officers and enlisted men.9 8
To the extent that individuals not in uniform were responsible for the
alleged abuses, or that the plaintiffs could not establish that individuals
in uniform had committed the abuses, the plaintiffs testified that such
individuals were always working in concert with, or at the direction of,
members of the military or security forces. For example, although
heavily armed individuals in plainclothes initially detained Professor
Mauricio, he was later transferred to the National Police headquarters in
San Salvador, where he was interrogated by individuals in uniform.9
Likewise, Ms. Gonzales was identified in the marketplace by an
individual not in uniform, but she was ultimately abducted by
uniformed National Guard members. 1°e
examination of Prof. Mauricio), 1565, 1588 (direct examination of Ms. Gonzales). Prof.
Mauricio and Dr. Romagoza were released from detention after family members in the
military intervened on their behalf. Ms. Gonzales survived because her captors thought
she was dead and had left her body in a garbage dump.
Id. at 626-28 (direct examination of Prof. Mauricio).
Id. at 613-15 (direct examination of Prof. Mauricio). Prof. Mauricio obtained this
letter by writing to the ICRC after the case was filed.
" See, e.g., id. at 1039-42, 1054-55 (re-direct examination of M. Popkin), 1427-28, 1440
(cross-examination of Prof. Karl), 1485-87 (re-direct examination of Prof. Karl).
' Id. at 579-81 (direct examination of Prof. Mauricio).
100 Id. at. 1561-65 (direct examination of Ms. Gonzales), 1596-99 (cross-examination of
Ms. Gonzales).
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b. Proof that the Regular Military and Security Forces Were
Responsible for the Majority of Abuses
The plaintiffs also demonstrated that even if there were independent
death squads operating within El Salvador during the period in
question, the vast majority of the abuses in El Salvador were attributable
to members of the formal military and security forces. The plaintiffs had
compiled a number of non-governmental and governmental reports that
reached this conclusion. However, the most authoritative document in
this regard was the report generated by the United Nations-sponsored
Truth Commission, TM which concluded that 85% of the violence was
attributable to the military and security forces, 10% to unaffiliated death
squads, and 5% to leftist guerilla forces. 10 2 Likewise, contemporaneous
U.S. government documents, including some authored by the
defendants' own expert witness, detailed the extent to which torture,
arbitrary detention, and disappearances were utilized by the military
and security forces to quell suspected reformers and terrorize their
families. In the context of this line of testimony, the defendants' own
expert conceded that the military and security forces were responsible
for the bulk of the abuses.14 He also testified that although the end of
General Vides Casanova's tenure as Minister of Defense saw
improvements in this regard, there was a resurgence in violence in 1987-
88 as evidenced by his own post-reporting cable.
101 The Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, U.N. Doc. No. S/25500 (April 1, 1993)
[hereinafter Truth Commission Report]; see Transc. at 527-28 (direct examination L.
Gilbert), 1142-53 (direct examination of Prof. Karl). Defendants stipulated to the
admissibility of that report, although the plaintiffs were confident it would be considered
admissible through the public records and reports exception to the hearsay bar (FRE
803(8)). See In re Korean Airlines Disaster, 932 F.2d 1475, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding that
International Civil Aviation Organization, intergovernmental body created by treaty under
auspices of United Nations, constituted public agency); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Corp., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1187 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ("we see nothing in the language of
803(8) and no hint in the Advisory Committee Note to indicate that the phrase 'public
offices or agencies'... cannot include an international governmental body such as the
United Nations"); see also United States v. M'Biye, 655 F.2d 1240, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(concluding that United Nations is "public office or agency" within meaning of FRE
803(10)).
10 Transc. at 528 (direct examination of Prof. Gilbert); see Truth Commission Report,
supra note 101, at 43.
o Transc. at 1228-37 (direct examination of Prof. Karl), 1926 (cross-examination of
Amb. Corr).
"' Id. at 1949-53 (cross-examination of Amb. Corr).
10" Id. at 1961 (cross-examination of Amb. Corr). Plaintiffs presented the jury with a
number of U.S. government cables transmitted between U.S. government agencies and the
Salvadoran embassy in San Salvador. The admissibility of these cables was stipulated to by
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This statistical evidence of the military and security forces'
overwhelming responsibility for abuses was supplemented by anecdotal
evidence from Father Paul Schindler, a priest who served in El Salvador
from 1972 to 1982. Father Schindler recounted various occasions in
which parishioners told him about abuses they suffered at the hands of
members of the military and security forces. He also described how he
attempted to secure the release of parishioners who had disappeared and
were detained in one of the various military detention centers in his
region.1
7
c. Proof that the Defendants Exercised De Jure Command as a
Threshold Matter
The "effective control" jury instruction made clear that a showing of de
jure command alone would not satisfy the first prong of the command
responsibility doctrine in keeping with ICTY jurisprudence.
Nonetheless, the plaintiffs laid out the case for the defendants' de jure
command by virtue of law, rank, and position within the military
108hierarchy. Much of this evidence came from the defendants' own
counsel, although the court did indicate that they would be admissible under either the
government documents (FRE 803(8)) or the business records (FRE 803(6)) exceptions to the
hearsay rule. Id. at 1850. Plaintiffs obtained the majority of these U.S. government cables
from the National Security Archive, a non-governmental organization that collects and
publishes declassified documents acquired through the Freedom of Information Act and
elsewhere. See The National Security Archive, available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv
(last visited Apr. 2, 2003).
" Transc. at 492 (direct examination of Father Schindler). This line of testimony,
although hearsay, was admissible as excited utterances (FRE 803(2)) or "dying
declarations" (FRE 804(b)(2)). See, e.g., Gross v. Greer, 773 F.2d 116, 120 (7th Cir. 1985)
(affirming admissibility of testimony about statements made by witness to crime); Carver
v. United States, 164 U.S. 694, 696 (1897) (admitting testimony about statements where
declarant asked for last rites).
'0 Transc. at 430-31 (direct examination of Father Schindler).
10 Prior to trial, the Romagoza plaintiffs had moved for partial summary judgment,
arguing that there were no facts in dispute with respect to the first prong of the doctrine of
command responsibility. See Romagoza v. Garcia, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment of Defendants' De lure Command Authority, or, Alternatively For Determination
of Facts Without Substantial Controversy (filed Feb. 6, 2001) (on file with the author).
Although plaintiffs were not seeking a final determination on the question of defendants'
command responsibility for the acts alleged, their motion made clear that summary
judgment may be "proper as to some causes of action but not as to others, or as to some
issues but not as to others, or as to some parties but not as to others." Barker v. Norman,
651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. 1981). Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that the court could
determine pursuant to Rule 56(d) that such facts were without substantial controversy and
accordingly should be deemed established at trial. See, e.g., Scott Paper Co. v. Taslog, Inc.,
638 F.2d 790, 796 n.4 (5th Cir. 1981). Plaintiffs' statement of undisputed facts set forth
excerpts from defendants' depositions, proposed exhibits, and interrogatory responses that
1238
HeinOnline  -- 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1238 2002-2003
Romagoza v. Garcia
testimony and documents. This placed the defendants in the difficult
position of either affirming their former de jure power or conceding
impotence and that their subordinates disrespected orders.
For example, the defendants produced numerous documents,
including several diagrams of the Salvadoran military and security
forces and copies of relevant Salvadoran legislation, demonstrating that
they occupied positions at the apex of the National Guard and Ministry
of Defense.1"" These documents and the defendants' testimony
confirmed that the Ministry of Defense encompassed both the military
and security forces (such as the National Guard and National Police
which were implicated in this case) and that the various forces often
conducted joint operations.' In their deposition and trial testimony, the
defendants confirmed that the military and security forces operated
according to a formal chain of command: orders were regularly issued
either by phone, in writing, or by messenger; subordinates were under a
duty to report significant events up the chain of command; and
subordinates wore uniforms and were inspected and supervised by
superiors, including the defendants." Both of the defendants were
affiliated with the military academy in San Salvador, first as cadets and
later as faculty, and they testified that the curriculum included study of
the proper functioning of this chain of command.112 The plaintiffs'
testimony also noted that the defendants' ability to exercise their
command was bolstered by the fact that the Salvadoran officer corps was
demonstrated that it was uncontested that defendants exercised de jure command over their
subordinates. Plaintiffs argued that on these undisputed facts, the court could rule as a
matter of law that the first prong of the doctrine of command responsibility had been
satisfied and that the jury should be instructed accordingly. This motion was denied
without opinion. After the issuance of the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Ford, plaintiffs
renewed their Rule 56(d) motion, arguing that given the presumption identified by the
Eleventh Circuit and in light of the evidence in the record, the fact of defendants' de jure
command authority over members of the Salvadoran military and security forces was
without substantial controversy and should be deemed established for purposes of trial. See
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Previously Denied Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment of Defendants' De Jure Command Authority, Or, Alternatively, For
Determination of Facts Without Substantial Controversy, Romagoza v. Garcia (filed May
10, 2002) (on file with the author). This motion was also denied.
109 See, e.g., Transc. at 326-28 (Gen. Vides Casanova deposition designations), 1760-64
(direct examination of Gen. Garcia), 1797-99 (cross-examination of Gen. Garcia).
110 Id. at 1802, 1805 (cross-examination of Gen. Garcia), 2257-58 (cross-examination of
Gen. Vides Casanova).
"' Id. at 307-10, 313 (Gen. Garcia deposition designations), 1807, 1813 (cross-
examination of Gen. Garcia).
.. See, e.g., id. at 1721-22, 1727 (direct examination of Gen. Garcia), 1794-97 (cross-
examination of Gen. Garcia), 2150-52 (direct examination of Gen. Vides Casanova), 2264-65
(cross-examination of Gen. Vides Casanova).
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a small one, so the defendants themselves could exercise oversight and
discipline directly.113 Indeed, both generals admitted in testimony that
General Vides Casanova, as Director-General of the National Guard, had
direct control over the National Guard headquarters, where Dr.
114Romagoza was detained and tortured, and of all of its interrogators.
The defendants' testimony also revealed that during the period in
question, the defendants bore all the trappings of power and authority:
they wore uniforms, they were saluted at military events, they were
called "sir" when addressed, they inspected troops, they were among the
first individuals ever elevated to the rank of general in the Salvadoran
military, and they regularly gave orders to subordinates."' Indeed,
General Vides Casanova testified in deposition that, to his knowledge,
no subordinate ever disobeyed his command. To emphasize the
defendants' formidable personas during the years in question,
particularly in light of their current grandfatherly appearances, the
plaintiffs presented to the jury a series of photographs taken during the
era showing the defendants in full uniform and exercising their
117
command over subordinates.
In addition to the defendants' own testimony, the plaintiffs called as
an expert witness a retired Argentine colonel, Colonel Jose Luis Garcia,
whose extensive knowledge of El Salvador stemmed from expert
testimony he had provided in an earlier trial of individuals accused of
murdering six Jesuits in 1989.11" By way of background, Colonel Garcia
testified about the operative rules of warfare, as set out in the 1949
Geneva Conventions and other governing treaties, and the structure and
operation of a military chain of command in general and in the
... Id. at 1471-72 (cross-examination of Prof. Karl).
,' Id. at 1778 (direct examination of Gen. Garcia), 2270 (cross-examination of Gen.
Vides Casanova).
"' Id. at 314 (videotape deposition of Gen. Garcia).
116 Id. at 334 (Gen. Vides Casanova deposition designations), 1348 (direct examination
of Prof. Karl), 2263-64 (cross-examination of Gen. Vides Casanova).
117 These photographs had been collected from various photo archives, such as
Magnum Photo, available at http://www.magnumphotos.com/c/ (last visited April 29,
2003). Photographs are generally deemed admissible so long as they are authenticated by
testimony from a witness that the photograph depicts what it is claimed to depict. United
States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 519, 525 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 926 (1978). The
authenticating witness need not be the person who took the photograph. United States. v.
Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154, 169 (1st Cir. 1994).
US Transc. at 793-80 (direct examination of Col. Garcia). Colonel Garcia had served as a
military expert in several previous human rights trials as well, but testimony about other
such proceedings was significantly limited by the court. Id. at 801 (direct examination of
Col. Garcia).
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Salvadoran military in particular. 9 Drawing upon provisions of the
Salvadoran military codes, he discussed the way in which Salvadoran
law assigned all powers of command to the defendants in their
respective positions.'
Similarly, a former U.S. ambassador to El Salvador, Ambassador
Robert White who served in El Salvador from March 1980 to March 1981,
testified that according to U.S. government assessments, the Salvadoran
military's chain of command was "unified." 2' He testified that the
Defense Ministry exercised complete control over members of the
military and security forces as well as over significant aspects of
governmental policy.' 2  He further testified that neither of the
defendants ever complained to him that he was unable to control his
troops.' 23  In this regard, several witnesses testified that the U.S.
government understood the defendants to be the persons capable of
ensuring respect for human rights, and that this understanding served as
the basis for the U.S. government's efforts to try to curb abuses in El
Salvador.124  For example, Ambassador White testified that U.S.
government sources informed members of the embassy staff that it was
the Minister of Defense who was capable of controlling abuses.1'5 Much
of this testimony was corroborated by declassified U.S. government
cables transmitted between Washington, D.C. and the U.S. embassy in
San Salvador confirming the functioning of the Salvadoran chain of
command and the defendants' top positions therein.126 These cables also
recorded the embassy staff's impressions of the role of members of the
military command structure in committing, encouraging, or tolerating
abuses by lower level members of the military and security forces.
,19 Id. at 825-28 (direct examination of Col. Garcia).
120 See also id. at 835 (direct examination of Col. Garcia), 1118-24 (direct examination of
Prof. Karl). Expert testimony on the structure and organization of military forces is often
employed in command responsibility cases to demonstrate the operation of the formal
chain of command and the competencies of and relationships between different individuals
within that chain of command. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T,
Judgement of the Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Tr. Chamber (Aug. 2, 2001) 626-27;
Hilao v. Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 776 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming admissibility of expert
testimony to prove agency relationship between perpetrators and defendants).
121 Transc. at 255 (direct examination of Amb. White).
"2 Id. at 254-55 (direct examination of Amb. White).
123 Id. at 260 (direct examination of Amb. White).
124 See, e.g., id. at 259 (direct examination of Amb. White), 1172-85 (direct examination of
Prof. Karl), 1487-88 (re-direct of Prof. Karl), 1942-43, 1957-58 (cross-examination of Amb.
Corr).
123 Id. at 256-59 (direct examination of Amb. White).
26 Id. at 1348-49 (direct examination of Prof. Karl).
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d. Proof that There Were No Impediments to the Exercise of the
Defendants' Command
To counter the defendants' arguments that the chaos wrought by the
civil war prevented them from fully exercising their command, the
plaintiffs presented expert and percipient testimony that the Salvadoran
military's communications and transportation infrastructure were
sufficiently developed and intact to enable the defendants to exercise
127
control over their troops. The plaintiffs also presented various forms
of anecdotal evidence from individuals who had been in El Salvador
during the period in question. Several witnesses testified that although
the level of violence was high, people generally went about their daily
lives, especially in San Salvador. Further, the plaintiffs demonstrated
that much of the repression of the civilian population pre-dated the
commencement of the civil war, overcoming any claim by the defendants
that the exigencies of prosecuting the war precluded them from
preventing or punishing abuses.129 In particular, cross-examination of
the defendants and their witness emphasized that two of the plaintiffs
had been detained and tortured within San Salvador, and the third was
detained a mere forty miles away, so problems with regional commands
and telecommunications would not have impacted the defendants'
abilities to supervise or exercise their command within the implicated
detention centers. 13°
In addition, Ambassador White testified about the extent and type of
military and logistical equipment provided by the United States to the
Salvadoran government as military aid.13 In particular, he and other
witnesses testified that because the U.S. government was legally
prevented from providing lethal aid, the majority of the in kind aid
provided to the Salvadoran military during the period in question
involved telecommunications equipment (such as night scopes, walkie-
talkies, and mobile radios), means of transportation (jeeps, trucks,
helicopters, and helicopter pads), other logistical materiel, and training
in the use of such equipment.1 32 Another expert witness demonstrated
that the provision of this non-lethal military aid increased dramatically
127 See, e.g., id. at 2293-95, 2297-2300 (rebuttal examination of Col. Garcia).
" See, e.g., id., at 574 (direct examination of Prof. Mauricio), 1352 (direct examination of
Prof. Karl).
" Id. at 2318-19 (rebuttal examination of Prof. Karl).
o Id. at 1949-55 (cross-examination of Amb. Corr), 2253-54 (cross-examination of Gen.
Vides Casanova).
131 Id. at 260, 290 (direct examination of Amb. White).
... Id. at 290 (direct examination of Amb. White).
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during the period in question.3 1 In addition, the plaintiffs conceded that
there were factions in the military, reflecting dissension over the best
strategy for winning the civil war. However, they presented expert
testimony that these factions did not impact the defendants' ability to
exercise their command, especially with respect to abuses of civilians.1M
Likewise, the defendants' own expert witness conceded in deposition
that the defendants had the capacity to give instructions to subordinates
about respecting human rights and to investigate human rights abuses.
e. Proof of the Defendants' De Facto Command
Several witnesses, including the plaintiffs, testified about how
prevalent the military was throughout the country and how tightly it
controlled all aspects of Salvadoran society. Professor Terry Karl of
Stanford University, as an expert witness,"' provided historical context
for this phenomenon by describing the way in which the military had
ruled El Salvador for most of the century by continually consolidating its
power within the society and repressing any opposition. 137  Father
Schindler testified that his region contained a number of well-outfitted
command posts representing the various military and security forces."m
Further, he testified that it was impossible to travel anywhere in the
country without passing through a military checkpoint, as every major
highway was riddled with such roadblocks staffed by members of the
military and security forces wielding extensive weaponry and
telecommunications equipment.
39
133 Id. at 1354-56 (direct examination of Prof. Karl), 1424-25 (cross-examination of Prof.
Karl).
Id. at 1349-50 (direct examination of Prof. Karl).
133 Id. at 1353-54 (cross-examination of Amb. Corr).
1 Courts regularly allow historians and social scientists to provide expert testimony
where relevant. See, e.g., S. Christian Leadership Council v. Sessions, 56 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir.
1995) (affirming admissibility of social science testimony relating to racially polarized
voting patterns), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1045 (1996); McLaughlin v. Boston School Comm, 976
F. Supp. 53 (D. Mass. 1997) (admitting testimony of historian in race discrimination case);
United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Oh. 1981) (admitting testimony of
Holocaust expert historian); United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
(admitting historical testimony regarding Nazi abuses in Estonia), affid, 685 F.2d 427 (2d
Cir. 1982); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998) (admitting
testimony by historian of abuses and terrorist activity in Iran).
... Transc. at 1093-1112, 1115-32 (direct examination of Prof. Karl).
13 Id. at 476-78 (direct examination of Father Schindler).
139 Id. at 417-86 (direct examination of Father Schindler).
2003] 1243
HeinOnline  -- 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1243 2002-2003
University of California, Davis
The plaintiffs also attempted to present the jury with concrete
instances in which the defendants exercised their command effectively,
suggesting that had the defendants wanted to prevent and punish
criminal conduct they could have. Much of this line of evidence came
from the defendants' own testimony, as they attempted to portray
themselves as reformers who were utilizing the military for positive
ends. For example, General Garcia testified about deploying the military
throughout the country to implement a national banking reform in a
mere twenty-four hour period and agrarian reform in a matter of days.'
4
Also, to the extent that such evidence was available, the plaintiffs
demonstrated that different military and security forces undertook
coordinated military attacks and campaigns, which implied that
direction was possible and that a functioning chain of command could be
141invoked when top leaders had the will to do so.
As a final line of argument, the plaintiffs introduced evidence
suggesting that the defendants' de facto control over their subordinates
was not merely coextensive with their de jure command, but was in fact
in excess of it. Professor Karl explained that, although the government
of which the defendants were members was technically a
civilian/military junta, it was in essence a military dictatorship. As a
result, the civilian members served "at the pleasure of" the military and,
accordingly, exercised no real control over the military.14 Rather, in her
estimation, General Garcia, when he was Minister of Defense, was the
real "power behind the throne." 143 Even the defendants' own expert
witness conceded that although General Garcia may have received
orders from members of the junta who were technically his superiors, he
would have "negotiated" with them about implementaton.1 4
f. Proof that Abuses Were Coordinated and Systematic, Implying
Control and Direction
Given that constructive knowledge of abuses could be established
with a showing that abuses were so rampant that the defendants should
- and must - have known about them, the temptation was to introduce
" Id at 1743-45 (direct examination of Gen. Garcia), 1821-25 (cross-examination of Gen.
Garcia), 2320 (rebuttal examination of Prof. Karl). The ICTY has noted that arguments by a
defendant that matters improved under his command operate as a concession of effective
control. Delalic Judgment, supra note 22, 91 743.
141 Transc. at 1353-54 (cross-examination of Amb. Corr).
"' See, e.g., id. at 1444 (cross-examination of Prof. Karl).
143 Id. at 2323-24 (rebuttal examination of Prof. Karl).
14 Id. at 1920 (direct examination of Amb. Corr).
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overwhelming evidence of how extensive human rights abuses were in
El Salvador during the period in question. At the same time, however,
the plaintiffs recognized that too much evidence in this regard
threatened to reinforce the defendants' chaos theory - especially for a
lay jury who may be stunned by the sheer magnitude of the violence -
and create an impression within the jury that El Salvador in the 1980s
was a country under no one's direction or control. Accordingly, the
Romagoza plaintiffs presented an array of evidence, including human
rights reports and expert testimony, identifying widespread and
systematic patterns of torture by members of the Salvadoran military
and security forces during the period in question. It was hoped that this
evidence, in addition to establishing the defendants' knowledge, would
also reinforce the plaintiffs' argument that abuses were under the control
of the Ministry of Defense.
For example, a former Amnesty International (AI) researcher for Latin
America, Michael McClintock, 145 testified about Al's efforts in El
Salvador to track patterns of violence. He and others testified that the
torture techniques employed throughout the country were common,
even within detention centers under the authority of different military
and security forces.146  The plaintiffs also demonstrated that the
particular demographic segments represented by the plaintiffs (doctors,
academics, and churchworkers) were specifically targeted for repression
because they were working with the poor and seeking reform.147 The
point was to demonstrate that El Salvador was not a failed state, as the
defendants would have it portrayed, but a police state in which the
military controlled all aspects of society and chose their victims
strategically.
Much of this evidence came in through the expert testimony of
Professor Karl, who drew upon her extensive research of the patterns
and practices of violence in El Salvador during the period in question.
She described the way in which consistent strategies of repression were
employed to terrorize the population, such as "draining the sea" by
eliminating popular support for rebel forces. 149  Further, she
demonstrated that the violence was too coordinated, and those
responsible were too well equipped, to have been attributable to rogue
" Id. at 725-93 (direct examination of M. McClintock).
" Id. at 1233-37 (direct examination of Prof. Karl).
141 Id. at 1223-27 (direct examination of Prof. Karl).
See, e.g., id. at 1076-79, 1084-90 (direct examination of Prof. Karl).
Id. at 1133-34 (direct examination of Prof. Karl).
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military factions or random acts by individual abusers."' Relying on
Freedom House's scale of terror, she discussed the way in which the
nature of the repression in El Salvador changed from widespread state
terror to more targeted terror at different times over the period of the
defendants' tenure depending upon the prevailing political climate. To
describe the phenomenon of violence in El Salvador to the jury, Professor
Karl utilized the metaphor of the "spigot," implying that the violence
could be turned on and off as was politically expedient or as pressure
from the United States for reform increased.
For example, Professor Karl testified about a series of visits by various
U.S. government officials, culminating in a visit by then-Vice President
George H.W. Bush in 1983. She described the way in which these
officials reprimanded members of the Salvadoran military, including
General Vides Casanova who had recently assumed the position of
Minister of Defense, for the high levels of official violence in the country
and threatened to curtail economic and military aid if the violence did
not diminish. She demonstrated graphically that after this series of
visits, the level of violence decreased considerably, implying that it was
controllable.'53  Important testimony in this regard also came from
Professor Lauren Gilbert, who in the 1990s was an investigator with the
United Nations-sponsored Truth Commission, which investigated and
reported upon the patterns of violence during the civil conflict15
4
Professor Gilbert described the Truth Commission's methodology and
results, which confirmed that the repression was anything but random.
155
2. Establishing Prong #2: Knowledge
Establishing the knowledge prong posed less of a challenge to a
certain degree, because the violence in El Salvador was so extensive and
well documented that any claims of lack of knowledge were sure to ring
hollow to the jury. At the same time, the plaintiffs recognized the need
150 Id. at 2307-14, 2317-18 (rebuttal examination of Prof. Karl). See, e.g., Prosecutor v.
Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement of the Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Tr. Chamber
(Mar. 3, 2000) 11 467, 529, 659 (noting that scale and systematic nature of crimes being
committed by subordinates could not be reconciled with defendant's argument that they
were committed by rogue elements).
151 Transc. at 1165-71 (direct examination of Prof. Karl).
152 Id. at 1222 (direct examination of Prof. Karl), 2317 (rebuttal examination of Prof.
Karl).
153 Id. at 1171-1205, 1220-23 (direct examination of Prof. Karl).
" Id. at 498-547, 654-715 (direct examination of Prof. Gilbert).
155 Id. at 500-04 (direct examination of Prof. Gilbert).
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to strike a balance between presenting overwhelming evidence of the
pervasiveness of violence by the military and security forces, in order to
prove both actual and constructive knowledge, while at the same time
demonstrating that such violence was coordinated, systematic, and
ultimately under the control of the defendants.
Thus, the plaintiffs introduced extensive evidence tending to show
both actual and constructive knowledge of abuses on the part of the
defendants. 15 In particular, the plaintiffs' evidence covered a number of
occasions in which credible sources, such as U.S. and Salvadoran
government officials, confronted the defendants with concrete incidents
linking their subordinates to human rights abuses. The plaintiffs also
presented evidence about the wide range of sources of information that
was readily available to the defendants and that would have put the
defendants on notice of abuses and of the need to conduct further
inquiry. On several occasions, this evidence was objected to on the
grounds that it constituted hearsay. However, the court regularly
instructed the jury that the evidence was relevant not for the truth of the
matter asserted, but to demonstrate notice to the defendants.
1 1
7
a. Proof of Actual Knowledge: What the Defendants Knew
The plaintiffs presented extensive evidence that the defendants
personally had been put on notice of abuses. In particular, Ambassador
White testified that he confronted the defendants about known abuses
by military and security forces and about strategies for curbing those
abuses.15' The defendants' own expert, Ambassador Corr, affirmed that
the United States was aware of incidents of torture and that he and other
embassy officials spoke with both of the defendants about such abuses.5 9
" As their guide to proving the knowledge prong, plaintiffs structured much of their
proof around the factors identified by the United Nations Commission of Experts on the
Former Yugoslavia: the number of illegal acts; the type of illegal acts; the scope of illegal
acts; the time during which the illegal acts occurred; the number and type of troops
involved; the geographic location of the acts; the widespread occurrence of such acts; the
modus operandi of similar acts; and the location and position of the commander. See
United Nations, Security Council, Letter Dated 24 May 1994 from the Secretary General to
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. A/1994/674, at 17 (1994).
... See, e.g., Transc. at 740-41, 752-54; see also WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
801.11(5)(a) ("Statements are not hearsay where they are offered.., to prove the extent of a
recipient's notice of certain conditions."); Katz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 913 F.2d 599, 605
(9th Cir. 1990) (affirming admissibility of newspaper and radio press releases to show
plaintiffs had notice of conditions); United States v. Chavis, 772 F.2d 100, 105 (5th Cir. 1985)
(finding admissible records of complaints to prove notice).
158 Id. at 197-98 (direct examination of Amb. White).
1 Id. at 1942-43, 1946-48 (cross-examination of Amb. Corr); see also id. at 1241-43 (direct
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Many of these interactions with the defendants were memorialized in the
"cable traffic" between the U.S. embassy in San Salvador and the U.S.
Department of State and other U.S. governmental agencies. This body of
evidence effectively rebutted the defendants' claims in their depositions
and testimony that they had never had such conversations with
Ambassador White or any other U.S. official.' 60
In addition, a former Organization of American States (OAS)
investigator, Roberto Alvarez, described a fact-finding mission in El
Salvador that occurred just prior to the time when the defendants
assumed their positions of power. His mission had discovered
clandestine torture chambers within the National Guard headquarters.
161
In 1979, the OAS delegation presented its findings and recommendations
to the new government, which included both of the defendants. Even
though the abuses had been committed during a prior regime, this
evidence was deemed admissible, because the investigative report was
presented to the government of which the defendants were members
and served to place the government on notice that torture, arbitrary
detention, and presumably disappearances had been employed by the
National Guard in official buildings.62 Mr. Alvarez testified that despite
this clear evidence of abuses by National Guardsmen, and the
presentation of a number of concrete recommendations for ensuring that
such abuses were not repeated, the new government did nothing to
investigate those acts or bring responsible parties to justice.16' Indeed,
General Garcia admitted to knowing about the reportiM and General
Vides Casanova admitted to failing to conduct an investigation even
though he had assumed command over the National Guard in whose
165headquarters the abuses were alleged to have occurred. And yet,
plaintiffs' expert Colonel Garcia testified that a commander has a duty to
know what is happening in his own and other regional headquarters,
which was particularly relevant to both Dr. Romagoza's testimony that
he was detained and tortured in the complex in which General Vides
Casanova had his office166 and Ms. Gonzales's testimony that she was
examination of Prof. Karl, reviewing deposition examination of Amb. Edwin Corr).
" See, e.g., id. at 1772 (direct examination of Gen. Garcia).
161 Id. at. 349-417 (direct examination of R. Alvarez).
Id. at 362-65 (direct examination of R. Alvarez).
Id. at 391-92 (direct examination of R. Alvarez).
1 Id. at 2028 (re-direct examination of Gen. Garcia).
16 Id. at 2272-75 (cross-examination of Gen. Vides Casanova), 2275-78, 2281 (re-direct
examination of Gen. Vides Casanova).
166 Id. at 903 (direct examination of Col. Garcia).
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detained at a National Guard post in San Vicente. 167
b. Proof of Constructive Knowledge: What the Defendants Should
Have Known
The plaintiffs' evidence indicated that there was a considerable
amount of information generally available to the defendants that would
have put them on notice that their subordinates were committing abuses.
For example, Mr. McClintock testified that Al would regularly issue so-
called Urgent Actions in order to mobilize Al's membership to write to
responsible government officials seeking the release or proper treatment
of political prisoners in El Salvador168 Mr. McClintock testified that top
members of the Salvadoran military would have received hundreds of
letters from Al members in response to these appeals. The plaintiffs had
located several letters that military officials had written in reply to these
Urgent Action letters acknowledging receipt of a complaint and usually
denying knowledge of the whereabouts of the individual who was the
subject of the inquiry. Most importantly, the plaintiffs located one
particular letter in Al's archives written by General Vides Casanova in
response to an Urgent Action appeal confirming that the records of the
National Guard had been "meticulously reviewed" and that there was
no evidence of the individual in question being detained.17° Although AI
and other non-governmental human rights organizations drafted
comprehensive reports about the scope of the violence in El Salvador,
17
the plaintiffs were not entitled to admit many such reports into evidence
on the grounds that their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative
value and it could not be satisfactorily established that the defendants or
others in the Salvadoran government ever received the reports.'71
Similarly, Father Schindler described the way in which the Catholic
Church and the archbishopric's legal aid office (Socorro Juridico, or
"Judicial Assistance") documented and publicized violence by military
and security forces. To assist families in locating loved ones who had
been "disappeared," Socorro Juridico maintained a series of books
containing photographs and other information about individuals found
dead or in detention. Father Schindler testified about how he had
167 Id. at 1561-62 (direct examination of Ms. Gonzales).
16 Id. at 729, 737-39 (direct examination of M. McClintock).
Id. at 751-69 (direct examination of M. McClintock).
170 Id. at 768 (direct examination of M. McClintock).
,71 See, e.g., id. at 1247 (direct examination of Prof. Karl).
17 Id. at 774-77 (direct examination of M. McClintock).
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collected and conveyed such information in his region. 73 In addition,
Father Schindler described the way in which the homilies of the late
Archbishop Oscar Romero, which were issued at least weekly prior to
his assassination and broadcast or published throughout the country,
described secific acts of violence and beseeched the military to stop the
repression. Both of the defendants admitted to being aware of these
homilies. 175
The plaintiffs also presented testimony that many human rights
abuses were designed to be highly visible in order to terrorize the
population.17 Presenting a number of his personal photographs, Father
Schindler described the way in which he would regularly visit local body
dumps in order to document and cremate the dead who were found
there. Many of these bodies showed signs of torture and mutilation and
had their thumbs tied behind their backs, which he testified was a
common way for the security forces to restrain prisoners. 177 He also
noted that he had to pass through several military checkpoints to reach
these areas, implying that whoever dumped the bodies would have also
had to pass through these checkpoints.
The plaintiffs also introduced a number of campos pagados, or "paid
ads," that had been published in the Salvadoran newspapers by
individuals seeking the whereabouts of friends, family members, and
colleagues who had been "disappeared". 79  For example, Professor
Mauricio introduced into evidence several campos pagados that had been
drafted by colleagues seeking his and others' release.'80 Ironically, in an
attempt to demonstrate that he was issuing orders to his subordinates to
respect the civilian population, General Garcia admitted into evidence
the text of a published speech that appeared on the same page as several
of these campos pagados.'' General Vides Casanova also admitted to
having seen such appeals.
8 2
Id. at 437 (direct examination of Father Schindler).
Id. at 492 (direct examination of Father Schindler).
Id. at 2182-83, 1773-74 (direct examination of Gen. Garcia).
I76 d. at 1248-49 (direct examination of Prof. Karl).
Id. at 437-38 (direct examination of Father Schindler).
Id. at 445 (direct examination of Father Schindler), 476-78 (cross-examination of
Father Schindler).
" See, e.g., id. at 1243-44 (direct examination of Prof. Karl).
80 Id. at 622-26 (direct examination of Prof. Mauricio).
... Id. at 2014-16 (cross-examination of Gen. Garcia).
,82 Id. at 2183 (direct examination Gen. Vides Casanova).
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One of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses was originally allowed to testify
as to her opinion about whether the defendants knew or should have
• - 183
known about the abuses being perpetrated against civilians. However,
the court subsequently changed its ruling on that point and instructed
the jury to disregard her testimony as to what the defendants knew about
the prevalence of human rights abuses because that was not the proper
subject of expert testimony.• 4 Nonetheless, the jury was entitled to
consider her testimony that, given all of these forms of notice, the
defendants should have known that subordinates were committing or
had committed abuses. Most powerfully, even the defendants' own
expert witness testified that one would have had to be a "dunce, blind or
deaf" not to know of abuses. 85
3. Establishing Prong #3: The Defendants' Omissions
The third prong of the command responsibility doctrine is formulated
in the disjunctive, providing that a commander is liable when he either
fails to prevent abuses or fails to punish them after the fact. The failure
to punish component of this prong could be narrowly interpreted to
cover only those cases in which a defendant failed to punish the
perpetrators of the precise acts complained of once he was made aware
of them. In many respects, the churchwomen's case was premised on
this narrow notion of failure to punish. Specifically, the Ford plaintiffs
argued that the defendants failed in their duty to punish the perpetrators
of the churchwomens' murders when they delegated the responsibility
of investigation to subordinates without follow up; impeded the
resulting investigation; were derelict in entrusting the task of
prosecution to the Salvadoran courts; or otherwise sought to cover up
evidence of the crimes. In contrast, the Romagoza plaintiffs took a more
expansive approach to the third prong of the doctrine by proceeding
under the theory that the failure to prevent and the failure to punish
criminal conduct are not necessarily mutually exclusive inquiries.
Rather, they advanced the position that a failure to punish abuses
generally also operates as a failure to prevent abuses by essentially
giving the "green light" to future abuses and contributing to a climate of
impunity.86
183 Id. at 1085-89 (direct examination of Prof. Karl).
" Id. at 1159-64, 1205-12, 1217-19, 1239.
18 Id. at 1249-52 (direct examination of Prof. Karl, reviewing deposition examination of
Amb. Edwin Corr), 1953-54 (cross-examination of Amb. Corr).
" Id. at 502-03 (direct examination of Prof. Gilbert), 1382 (direct examination of Prof.
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The plaintiffs' evidence with respect to this prong proceeded along
three tracks. First, the plaintiffs presented testimony indicating that the
defendants undertook no preventative or punitive measures when
confronted with abuses being committed by their subordinates. Second,
although this showing alone would have been sufficient to base liability,
the command responsibility doctrine also invites the party with the
burden of proof to present a standard of conduct of what would have
been an appropriate response to the circumstances to set the benchmark
for the finder of fact to evaluate the defendants' conduct. Accordingly,
the Romagoza plaintiffs presented testimony about concrete measures the
defendants should and could have taken to discharge their duty given
their legal authority and the resources and institutions available to them.
Third, the plaintiffs presented testimony and evidence about what the
defendants actually did. This evidence demonstrated that rather than
preventing or punishing criminal conduct by subordinates, the
defendants actually encouraged, promoted or at the very least condoned
it.
a. Proof that the Defendants Did Nothing to Prevent or Punish
Criminal Behavior
The defendants were confronted in their depositions and at trial with
several instances in which they were made aware of abuses by members
of the military but failed to act. On such occasions, the defendants
117generally admitted that they conducted no investigation or follow up.
Other witnesses testified about a number of opportunities for the
defendants to investigate and punish known abuses, which they failed to
undertake. 88  For example, Professor Karl testified that then-Vice
President Bush presented General Vides Casanova with the names of
members of the military and security forces who should be removed
from their posts, but no action was taken with respect to any of these
individuals.18 9  Another of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses - Ms.
Margaret Popkin, the author of a book on the Salvadoran justice system
- testified that no officer was ever convicted of a human rights crime
during the period in question.19 0  Ambassador Corr echoed this
Karl).
187 Id. at 317-18 (direct examination of Gen. Garcia), 1818-20, 1829-32 (cross-examination
of Gen. Garcia).
See, e.g., id. at 244-47, 253 (direct of Amb. White).
Id. at 1343 (direct examination of Prof. Karl).
Id. at 1043 (direct examination of M. Popkin).
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assessment. T9 By the defendants' own testimony, to the extent that
members of the military were prosecuted, it was for common crimes,
such as murder or robbery, and not for human rights abuses.192
Indeed, the defendants were unable to identify any specific actions
they took to prevent abuses or punish perpetrators. Although they
claimed to have issued standing orders against the commission of torture193
and other abuses, they produced only vague guidelines addressing the
need for discipline generally but not specifically condemning or
prohibiting the use of torture or other human rights abuses.19 They also
produced several speeches that had been reproduced in Salvadoran
195
newspapers that they claimed were directed at subordinates.
However, on cross-examination, it was revealed that many of these so-
called "orders" were little more than broad pronouncements
encouraging the public to trust and respect the military, denying abuses
by the military, and promising to implement reforms and free
elections. 1%  Although the defendants produced an International
Committee of the Red Cross pamphlet entitled "Soldier's Manual," both
of the defendants conceded that although the pamphlet was published in
1972 it was not distributed to troops until approximately 1983.197 They
also admitted that there was no centralized reporting mechanism for
human rights complaints and that they did not personally visit detention
centers.198
Professor Karl testified that this pervasive inaction by the military can
be explained by the fact that the military was governed by an entrenched
"code of silence" - a term employed by Ambassador Corr in his post
191 Id. at 1976 (cross-examination of Amb. Corr).
Id. at 2188 (direct examination Gen. Vides Casanova), 2255-56 (cross-examination of
Gen. Vides Casanova).
Id. at 1767-69 (direct examination of Gen. Garcia).
Id. at 2121-35 (re-direct examination of Gen. Garcia), 2138 (re-cross examination of
Gen. Garcia).
" Id. at 1748-54 (direct examination of Gen. Garcia), 2066-2103 (re-direct examination
of Gen. Garcia), 2232-34 (direct examination Gen. Vides Casanova).
Id. at 1814 (cross-examination of Gen. Garcia), 2066-2103 (re-direct examination of
Gen. Garcia).
" Id. at 2116 (re-direct examination of Gen. Garcia), 2140-42 (re-cross examination of
Gen. Garcia), 2200-01 (direct examination Gen. Vides Casanova). General Vides Casanova
attempted to introduce another manual directing soldiers to respect human rights, but this
exhibit was withdrawn as irrelevant when it was revealed that it had been published in
1994, well after the events in question. Id. at 2235-40 (direct examination Gen. Vides
Casanova).
198 Id. at 2009-10 (cross-examination of Gen. Garcia), 2191 (direct examination Gen.
Vides Casanova), 2256 (cross-examination of Gen. Vides Casanova).
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reporting cable - that protected military members from scrutiny or
discipline and that gave rise to collective denials when allegations were
launched against the military.19 The cable issued by Ambassador Corr
corroborated these observations,2 ° and he conceded at trial that it was
the responsibility of high ranking officers to break the code of silence to
2011the extent that it interfered with the proper functioning of command.
There was also testimony that this code of silence was facilitated by the
so called "tanda system," which was a feature of Salvadoran military
training that bound graduates of the same graduating class together
through strong bonds of loyalty. °2
b. Proof of What the Defendants Could Have Done
The plaintiffs' military expert, Colonel Garcia, testified about the
formal and informal corrective actions that were available to the
defendants. He indicated that in the face of allegations that subordinates
were committing abuses, the defendants could and should have taken
specific actions. These actions included issuing direct orders to all
subordinates to respect human rights, implementing a strict reporting
mechanism to track instances in which weapons were discharged or
civilians detained, conducting or ordering investigations, convening a
military tribunal or court martial, transferring or otherwise cashiering
individuals associated with abuses, inspecting detention centers and
other sites at which human rights abuses were alleged to have occurred,
and coordinating responses with superiors within other levels within the
chain of command. In this regard, he referred to specific provisions
within the Salvadoran Military Code of Justice authorizing -and indeed
obligating - the defendants to undertake internal disciplinary measures
204in response to abuses. In response, the defendants admitted that by
law they could have established military tribunals to prosecute members
of the military for rights abuses but that they never did so.20 Based upon
his research, Colonel Garcia testified that, in his expert opinion, the
defendants had failed in their duty to respond to credible allegations of
" Id. at 1306-13, 1321-29 (direct examination of Prof. Karl, reviewing deposition
examination of Amb. Edwin Corr).
Id. at 1963-64, 1967-69, 1974-78 (cross-examination of Amb. Corr).
... Id. at 1976 (cross-examination of Amb. Corr).
Id. at 1215 (direct examination of Prof. Karl), 1801-3 (cross-examination of Gen.
Garcia).
3 See, e.g., id. at 849-56, 899-900, 911-19 (direct examination of Col. Garcia).
Id. at 863-64, 905-09 (direct examination of Col. Garcia).
206 Id. at 334-45 (deposition designations for Gen. Vides Casanova).
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abuses; and if they were unable to control their troops, they should
have relinquished their command. 7
Likewise, Professor Karl outlined an additional series of concrete steps
the defendants could have taken to fulfill their duty to prevent and
punish criminal conduct. These included issuing repeated and public
denunciations of abuses, demanding immediate reports of all civilian
deaths and detentions, punishing officers for failing to make such reports
or to follow up on abuses, issuing clear instructions about the treatment
of civilians and how to handle allegations of abuses, personally
inspecting sites where human rights abuses were alleged to have
occurred, forwarding cases of abuses to the civilian court system,
cooperating with judicial and non-governmental investigations,
protecting witnesses to human rights abuses, requesting help from the
United States and elsewhere in preventing abuses and conducting
investigations, and removing rather than promoting individuals accused
208
of rights violations. Professor Karl testified that the defendants could
have as a legal and practical matter implemented each of these specific
measures, but that they did not do so. 2' Further, she presented several
U.S. government cables indicating that the United States had offered
investigative help, especially in cases in which United States citizens
were involved, but that the Salvadoran military had declined thisassitanc an in act mpeed " . . 210
assistance and in fact impeded investigations. Ambassador Corr
likewise admitted that the U.S. government presented the defendants
with concrete recommendations for curbing abuses." He further
testified that had the recommendations been implemented they would
212have been effective at preventing further abuses.
Ms. Popkin gave additional testimony about various legal actions the
military could have undertaken to address allegations of human rights
abuses by their members. These included identifying responsible
individuals and their commanders, reviewing log books and other
reporting mechanisms to determine which troops may have been
involved in abuses, turning responsible individuals over to the civilian
justice system in the event military justice would not be forthcoming for
whatever reason, prohibiting the establishment of detention centers
Id. at 853 (direct examination of Col. Garcia).
207 Id. at 900 (direct examination of Col. Garcia).
208 Id. at 1127 (direct examination of Prof. Karl).
Id. at 1370-81 (direct examination of Prof. Karl).
210 Id. at 1319-20 (direct examination of Prof. Karl).
"I Id. at 1942-43, 1946-48 (cross-examination of Amb. Corr).
2.2 Id. at 1983-88 (cross-examination of Amb. Corr).
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within military headquarters and posts, and utilizing only public
detention centers to detain civilians. She noted that the military failed
to implement any of these measures, even though outside observers and
human rights monitors had made recommendations to this effect.
21 4
c. Proof of What the Defendants Did Instead
In contrast to this range of options available to the defendants, the
plaintiffs presented testimony about what the defendants did in fact do.
For example, there was expert testimony about the way in which the
defendants consolidated their power by transferring reformist-minded
officers to negligible posts or removing reformers from command
215
completely. In addition, the plaintiffs demonstrated that instead of
punishing, investigating, demoting, discharging, or otherwise
disciplining members of the military alleged to be responsible for abuses,
these individuals were actually protected and promoted by the
defendants, as was described in various U.S. government cables.1 6 A
particular incident was discussed at length, in which a reformist in the
military interrupted a secret meeting between a number of individuals
associated with rights violations. Rather than ensuring the investigation
and prosecution of the individuals involved, General Garcia arranged for
them to be released, and the reformist was eventually relieved of his
217
command and forced to resign.
As testified to by Professor Gilbert, both of the defendants had been
identified as responsible for abuses by the Truth Commission's final
report. In particular, the Truth Commission report made various
findings with respect to high profile acts of violence that the defendants
either denied had happened or whose investigation the defendants
211
sought to impede or cover up. Professor Karl also introduced several
U.S. government cables that recounted conversations with General
Garcia with respect to the El Mozote massacre and other incidents and
recorded how General Garcia denied that abuses had occurred as alleged
and ultimately initiated no investigation."' Indeed, one of Ambassador
213 Id. at 1005-08 (direct examination of M. Popkin).
214 Id. at 1009 (direct examination of M. Popkin).
215 Id. at 1093-1112, 1115-32 (direct examination of Prof. Karl), 1430-33, 1443, 1484-85
(cross-examination of Prof. Karl), 2296-98 (rebuttal examination of Col. Garcia).
216 See, e.g., id. at 1189-90, 1329-46 (direct examination of Prof. Karl).
21' See, e.g., id. at 1436-48, 1483 (cross-examination of Prof. Karl).
... Id. at 529, 537-38, 694-95 (direct examination of Prof. Gilbert); see also id. at 1358-68
(direct examination of Prof. Karl).
219 Id. at 1168 (direct examination of Prof. Karl), 2021-23 (cross-examination of Gen.
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Corr's own cables recounted an incident in which General Vides
Casanova had blatantly impeded an investigation into abuses by the
National Guard. 0  Professor Karl described this cycle of denial,
minimization, obstruction, and inaction with respect to known abuses as
a classic "pattern of deniability" on the part of the defendants.21
Ms. Popkin further testified that the military prevented the civilian
justice system from handling cases involving military perpetrators.
Indeed, she noted that although the National Guard and National Police
were supposed to be "auxiliary organs" of the judicial system and assist
in the carrying out of criminal investigations, these forces did not
function in this capacity when the crimes in question had been
222
committed by their own or by members of the military. Rather,
according to her testimony, the military and security forces impeded
investigations. By way of example, she discussed the way in which the
military had interfered in the investigation into a particularly notorious
incident - the murder of two United States advisors from the American
Institute for Free Labor Development and the Salvadoran head of the
Salvadoran Agrarian Reform Institute at the Sheraton Hotel in
downtown San Salvador by members of the National Guard.m It was
also established that General Vides Casanova later promoted two
individuals associated with that incident.2
4
CONCLUSION
The Salvadoran proceedings demonstrate the challenges of holding
commanders legally responsible under the doctrine of command
responsibility for human rights violations committed by their
subordinates. These challenges are particularly acute given the ICTY's
adoption of the effective control standard of subordination. This
standard places a substantial burden on individuals injured by low level
members of a military or paramilitary force to demonstrate that a
defendants de jure command translated into an actual ability to control
his subordinates given the prevailing circumstances at the time.
Plaintiffs are thus required to introduce evidence regarding, among
Garcia).
22 Id. at 1978-83 (cross-examination of Amb. Corr).
" Id. at 1356-58 (direct examination of Prof. Karl).
' Id. at 997-1003 (direct examination of M. Popkin).
Id. at 1009, 1018-39 (direct examination of M. Popkin), 1055-56 (re-direct examination
of M. Popkin).
" Id. at 2266-70 (cross-examination of Gen. Vides Casanova).
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other things, the structure and operation of the military command
hierarchy; country conditions in terms of telecommunications,
transportation, and other logistical factors; concrete situations in which
the defendant demonstrated his ability to exercise his command when it
was expedient to do so; and, actions by subordinates or a pattern of
violations that could only be the result of direction or coordination from
the command hierarchy. This is a more searching inquiry then has been
required in prior command responsibility cases brought under the
ATCA and the TVPA.
Nonetheless, the Romagoza proceedings demonstrate that the
challenges posed by the effective control standard are not
insurmountable. In the face of the plaintiffs' evidentiary approach as
outlined in this Essay, the Romagoza jury did not find credible the
defendants' denials that their subordinates were committing abuses or
their protestations that, in the chaos of the civil war, there was nothing
more they could have done. Indeed, the jury foreperson told journalists
after the trial, "[t]he generals were in charge of the National Guard and
the country, it was a military dictatorship and they had the ability to do
whatever they chose to do or not do, and they had the right and the
obligation.'22
This juror's explanation for the verdict reveals that military
commanders occupy a position of great public trust and responsibility.
Accordingly, international law, in the form of the doctrine of command
responsibility, imposes on them a legal duty to prevent and punish
atrocities committed by individuals under their command or control.
The doctrine recognizes that commanders are in the best position to
prevent the violations of international humanitarian law and human
rights norms that characterized the Ford and Romagoza cases.226 The
Romagoza case should serve as a warning to future despots that the
conduct of their subordinates and their own derelictions of command
could someday by subject to the scrutiny of a United States jury. As the
international community becomes increasingly committed to ensuring
accountability for human rights abuses in domestic and international
fora, perhaps the doctrine of command responsibility and the threat of
later prosecution will begin to exercise a deterrent effect and promote
" David Gonzales, Torture Victims in El Salvador are Awarded $54 Million, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 2002, at A8.
26 Maj. Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in
Contemporary Military Operations, 164 MIL. L. REV. 155, 166 (2000) (noting that commanders
are society's last "line of defense").
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vigilance on the part of commanders to properly supervise individuals
under their command and control.
HeinOnline  -- 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1259 2002-2003
HeinOnline  -- 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1260 2002-2003
